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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
In the last several years, most of the public debate on electronic voting has concerned 
whether voting machines should include a voter-verifiable paper record.  Today, in much of 
the country, that debate is over: thirty states require voter-verifiable paper records.1  Another 
eight states use voter-verifiable paper records in every county without requiring them,2 and 
of the remaining twelve states that do not use voter-verifiable paper records statewide, 
several are currently considering legislation that would mandate such records in the future.3 
 
The widespread adoption of voter-verifiable paper records does not, however, resolve the 
security, reliability, and verifiability issues with electronic voting that many groups, including 
the Brennan Center, have identified.  To the contrary, as the Brennan Center noted in its 
June 2006 comprehensive study of electronic voting system security The Machinery of 
Democracy: Protecting Elections in an Electronic World,4 voter-verifiable paper records by 
themselves are “of questionable security value.”  Paper records will not prevent 
programming errors, software bugs or the introduction of malicious software into voting 
systems.  If paper is to have any real security value, it must be used to check, or “audit,” the 
voting system’s electronic records. 
 
Unfortunately, the purpose and value of voter-verifiable paper records has received scant 
attention and little study until recently.  In the last year, statisticians and election integrity 
experts have appeared to make up for lost time, authoring and releasing dozens of separate 
papers about post-election audits of voter-verifiable paper records.5  Meanwhile, the 
prospect of a federal requirement for post-election audits has galvanized many election 
officials and election integrity activists into publicly debating various audit methods and 
procedures.6 
 
Much of the recent literature on post-election audits has been sharply critical of existing 
audit laws, regulations and practices.7 However, many of these papers seem to contradict 
each other by promoting very different audit models, and very few provide practical advice 
about how to implement their recommendations to improve audit practices. 
 
Sorting through this flood of often seemingly contradictory information and using it to 
improve post-election audits is no easy task.  It is, however, critically important.  In the next 
few months, Congress and several state legislatures are likely to consider and pass into law 
new post-election audit requirements, and the several states that already conduct post-
election audits are considering amendments to existing audit laws and procedures.8 
 
With the intention of assisting legislators, election officials and the public make sense of this 
new information and convert it into realistic audit practices, the Brennan Center and the 
Samuelson Law, Technology and Public Policy Clinic at Boalt Hall School of Law 
(University of California Berkeley) convened a blue ribbon panel (the “Audit Panel”) of 
statisticians, voting experts, computer scientists and several of the nation’s leading election 
officials.  Together with the Audit Panel, the Brennan Center and the Samuelson Clinic 
spent several months reviewing and evaluating both existing post-election audit laws and 
procedures, and the papers of academics and election integrity activists that have frequently 
criticized such laws and procedures as inadequate.  Following this review and extensive 
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consultation with the Audit Panel, the Brennan Center and the Samuelson Clinic make 
several practical recommendations for improving post-election audits, regardless of the audit 
method that a jurisdiction ultimately decides to adopt. 
 
 
A. LIMITATIONS OF STUDY 
 
We have limited our study to post-election audits of voter-verifiable paper records: how jurisdictions 
can use a randomly selected percentage of voter-verifiable paper records after the polls have 
closed to check the electronic vote tallies and the performance of electronic voting 
machines.  There are many other types of examinations and audits of voting machines (and 
the entire voting system) that should be conducted before and after the polls close.  For 
example, sound federal and state certification of voting systems, acceptance testing, and 
“logic and accuracy” testing are forms of pre-election audits and examinations that are 
critical to ensuring that voting systems accurately record and count votes.  Similarly, after an 
election, comparisons of the number of ballots cast to the number of voters who signed in, 
interviews with poll workers, and full recounts of a contested election are important ways of 
adding transparency to elections and improving voting technology and election 
administration. 
 
Instead of attempting to survey all of these elements of examination and auditing, we have 
chosen to focus on voter-verifiable record-based audits of electronic vote tallies because 
these audits are at the center of many current legislative debates over election integrity, and 
because they hold immediate and long-term value for election integrity.  The kinds of post-
election audits that we discuss here may lend confidence in the results of a close election as 
well as shed light on voting system problems even when elections are not close.  Although it 
would be ideal to detect voting system problems before an election takes place, the past few 
elections have shown that some problems may be unavoidable, irrespective of the 
precautions that election officials take.  This report sets forth ways in which post-election 
audits using voter-verifiable paper records may nevertheless provide a systematic means of 
understanding voting system performance (and failures).  
 
 
B. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
 
Our study of the current academic literature and current state audit laws and procedures 
points to several important findings: 
 
• Post-election audits of voter-verifiable paper records are a critical tool for detecting 
ballot-counting errors, discouraging fraud, and improving the security and reliability 
of electronic voting machines in future elections.  Unfortunately, of the thirty-eight 
states that require or use voter-verifiable paper records throughout the state, twenty-
three do not require such audits after every election.9 
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• Of the few states that currently require and conduct post-election audits, none has 
adopted audit models that will maximize the likelihood of finding clever and targeted 
software-based attacks, non-systemic programming errors, and software bugs that 
could change the outcome of an election. 
 
• We are aware of only one state, North Carolina, that has collected and made public 
the most significant data from post-election audits for the purpose of improving 
future elections.  Based upon our review of state laws and interviews with state 
election officials, we have concluded that the vast majority of states conducting 
audits are not using them in a way that will maximize their ability to improve 
elections in the future.  
 
• Regardless of the audit model a jurisdiction implements, there are several simple, 
practical, and inexpensive procedures that it can adopt to achieve the most important 
post-election auditing goals, without imposing unnecessary burdens on election 
officials. 
 
 
C. POST-ELECTION AUDIT CONSIDERATIONS 
 
In our analysis of the post-election audit debate, we found that much of the disagreement 
about what constitutes a “sound” audit actually centers on disagreement over the purpose of 
an audit.  In fact, there are a number of goals that a post-election audit may serve, and by 
emphasizing one, jurisdictions may make it more difficult to fulfill another.  Among the 
goals an audit can fulfill are: 
 
• creating an appropriate level of public confidence in the results of an election; 
 
• deterring fraud against the voting system; 
 
• detecting and providing information about large-scale, systemic errors;  
 
• providing feedback that will allow jurisdictions to improve voting technology and 
election administration in future years; 
 
• providing additional incentives and benchmarks for elections staff to reach higher 
standards of accuracy;10 and 
 
• confirming, to a high level of confidence, that a complete manual recount would not 
change the outcome of the race.11 
 
This paper is the first to articulate all of these goals and to comprehensively examine the 
trade-offs that may be entailed to satisfy all of them.  We also look at additional factors that 
jurisdictions will probably want to consider when developing audit methods and procedures, 
including to what extent the audits will be administratively burdensome (i.e., how much they 
will cost, how many hours they will take to complete, and how much certainty a jurisdiction 
will have about these issues prior to Election Day) and whether their effectiveness will 
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depend heavily on the subjective judgments of election and other public officials in charge of 
the audit (something jurisdictions should generally want to avoid).  
 
In most cases, lower administrative costs and greater certainty about the audit ahead of time 
means less certainty that evidence of an outcome-changing error or of fraud will be found 
once the election is over.  Similarly, audits that are efficient at detecting widely distributed, 
systemic errors can provide feedback to improve elections, but are often poorer at 
pinpointing errors that might have affected the outcome of an election.  They also generally 
provide election officials with little guidance as to what should be done when discrepancies 
between the paper and electronic records are found. 
 
 
D. SUMMARY OF AUDIT RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
We do not endorse any particular audit model as the “best” one.  Instead, we have identified 
certain basic principles that all jurisdictions should adopt, regardless of the audit model they 
choose.  These recommendations are based on consultation with the Audit Panel and a 
thorough review of current practices in states and counties where audits are conducted, as 
well as recent academic literature on post-election audits.  The recommendations can be 
broken into three categories: (1) best practices for selecting votes to be audited; (2) best 
practices for conducting the audit itself; and (3) best practices for ensuring audit 
effectiveness.  They are discussed in much greater detail in “Audit Best Practices” infra at 
page 30 (additional recommendations for specific models are discussed in “A Review of 
Current and Proposed Audit Models” infra at page 9). 
 
SELECTING VOTES TO BE AUDITED 
 
The method and manner employed by a jurisdiction for choosing votes to audit will have a 
tremendous impact on whether the audit itself is administratively burdensome, engenders 
public confidence in election results, detects errors, and provides feedback that will allow 
jurisdictions to improve elections in the future.  Among the most important steps that 
jurisdictions can take in selecting votes to be audited are the following: 
 
• Use Transparent and Random Selection Processes for All Auditing 
Procedures.  Audits are more likely to prevent fraud and produce greater voter 
confidence in election results if the public can verify that the paper records, 
machines, or precincts to be audited are chosen in a truly random manner. 
 
• Consider Selecting Precincts or Machines for Auditing at the State Level.  
While there are some disadvantages to centrally-conducted audit selection (discussed 
infra at page 32), there are many benefits for election officials to consider, including 
efficiency, transparency, and standardized procedures.  By choosing precincts or 
machines to audit at the state level, counties are relieved of this responsibility and 
associated administrative tasks.  Additionally, audit selection at the state level 
facilitates the selection of precincts to audit in election districts that cross 
jurisdictional boundaries.  Finally, public observers of random selection processes 
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would be able to watch a single selection process, rather than attempt to watch 
multiple county selection processes around a state. 
 
• Audit a Minimum Percentage or Number of Precincts or Machines for Each 
Election, Including At Least One Machine Model and/or Precinct in Each 
County.  Much of the recent academic literature on post-election audits focuses on 
catching error or fraud that could change the outcome of an election.  But finding an 
error that has changed the outcome of an election is in many ways a worst case 
scenario; most would prefer finding and correcting such errors in landslide elections 
where they could not affect the outcome.  An audit of a minimum number of 
precincts or machines supports election officials’ efforts to monitor overall voting 
system performance and ensure that the machines operate optimally. 
 
• Account for Precinct Size Variability in Audit Selection and Sample Size 
Calculations.  Any procedures that do not take into account the varying number of 
votes in different precincts are likely to overestimate the audit’s confidence level (or 
“statistical power”) with respect to uncovering irregularities that could change the 
outcome of an election.  Methods to deal with precinct size variability can be as 
simple as sorting precincts into bins of certain sizes (e.g., “small,” “medium,” and 
“large”) and conducting random selection within each bin, or listing precincts in 
order of size and ensuring that auditors select a certain number of large precincts. 
 
• Allow Candidates To Select Precincts or Machines To Be Audited.  Making 
this option available to candidates would serve two purposes.  First, it would give 
greater assurance to candidates and their supporters that that the election results are 
correct.  Second, it would allow candidates to prompt audits of seemingly anomalous 
results that could suggest a programming error or miscount. 
 
CONDUCTING THE AUDIT 
 
There are specific steps that every jurisdiction can take to make it far more likely that the 
audit is accurate, useful to election officials, and likely to catch errors that could change the 
outcome of certain races.  Most importantly, jurisdictions should: 
 
• Freeze and Publish Unofficial Election Results Before Selecting Precincts or 
Machines to be Audited.  Election officials should freeze and publish unofficial 
election results once all returns are received from jurisdictions.  The random 
selection of precincts or machines to be audited should only occur afterwards.  This 
practice allows the public to verify the accuracy and fairness of audit results. 
 
• Conduct “Blind” Manual Counts.  While unofficial totals should be made 
available to the public so that they can verify the accuracy and fairness of the audit, 
manual counters should be “blind” to the unofficial election results for the machines 
they are auditing to ensure that knowledge of the unofficial results does not influence 
their counting. 
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• Don’t Just Match – Count! (Record and Publicly Release Meaningful Data on 
Votes Cast).  Audits that record and detail the overvotes, undervotes, blank votes, 
spoiled ballots, and, in the case of DREs, cancellations, could be extremely helpful in 
revealing software attacks and software bugs and in identifying problems with ballot 
design and/or ballot instructions.  Rather than only matching paper and electronic 
tallies, election officials should record and publicly release this meaningful data, 
which should be useful for improving elections in the future. 
 
• Consider Auditing by Machine Rather Than Precinct.  In many states, it will be 
more efficient to audit by machine or ballot batches rather than by precinct.  
Particularly in states that use touch-screen voting machines, jurisdictions will be able 
to achieve the same level of confidence in their results by auditing a smaller 
percentage of machines. 
 
• Audit All Methods of Voting.  In conducting post-election audits, election officials 
should not exclude any category of votes (e.g., absentee ballots, provisional ballots, 
damaged ballots).  In 2004, seven states reported that more than twenty percent of 
all votes were cast during early voting periods.12  Excluding these ballots from an 
audit would leave a significant opportunity for errors to remain undetected. 
 
ENSURING OVERALL AUDIT EFFECTIVENESS 
 
If the audit is to be effective, jurisdictions must have certain basic policies and practices in 
place.  Principally, jurisdictions ought to: 
 
• Ensure the Physical Security of Audit Materials.  Effective auditing of voter-
verifiable paper records will serve to deter attacks on voting systems and identify 
problems only if states have implemented solid procedures to ensure the physical 
security of election materials used in a post-election audit, including the paper 
records of the vote, voting machines, and tally servers. 
 
• Implement Effective Procedures for Addressing Evidence of Fraud or Error.  
If audits are to have a real deterrent effect, jurisdictions must adopt clear procedures 
for addressing discrepancies between the paper records and electronic tallies when 
they are found. Without protocols for responding to discrepancies, the detection of 
fraud or error will not prevent it from successfully altering the outcome of an 
election.  Recommended responses include making corrections where warranted, 
disallowing results if an appropriate remedy cannot be determined, and ensuring 
accountability for discrepancies.  Jurisdictions should document discrepancies and 
any actions in response to them in publicly available discrepancy logs. 
 
When there have been no losses or additions of paper records, a single unexplained 
discrepancy between the paper records and electronic tallies is a strong indication of 
a software problem of some kind.  Any such discrepancy, even if it is just one vote 
and can have no effect on the outcome, is grounds for a review of voting machine 
software code.  Such a review need not delay certification of the election, but it 
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should be investigated.  To be effective, election officials must have the ability to 
audit the code, not just the votes. 
 
• Audit the Entire Voting System, Not Just the Machines.  Although this study 
focuses only on post-election audits of voter-verifiable paper records, jurisdictions 
should conduct audits of the entire voting system to catch errors or fraud in other 
parts of the voting system.  Historically, incorrect vote totals often result from 
aggregation mistakes at central vote tally locations.  Accordingly, good audit 
protocols will mandate that the entire system – from early and absentee ballots to 
aggregation at the tally server – be audited for accuracy.  This should also include, at 
the very least, the ability of election officials to audit the code where they deem 
necessary. 
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II. A REVIEW OF CURRENT AND PROPOSED AUDIT 
MODELS 
 
There are three basic categories of post-election audits described in current law, proposed 
bills, and academic literature.  They are as follows: 
 
A. Fixed-Percentage Audit Model.  In this model, jurisdictions are required to 
randomly select a fixed percentage of precincts or machines to audit.  All voter-
verifiable paper records for the selected precincts or machines are hand-counted and 
compared to the electronic tallies.  Most states that currently conduct post-election 
audits embrace this model. 
 
B. Adjustable-Percentage Audit Model.  This model requires jurisdictions to 
determine the percentage of precincts or machines to audit based on the size of the 
margin of victory between the two leading candidates in a race.  The smaller the 
margin of victory, the larger the percentage of precincts or machines to audit.  While 
we are unaware of any state that has explicitly adopted a form of this audit model, 
several states require full or partial recounts of voter-verifiable paper records when 
races are extremely close.13  Moreover, most of the recent academic articles we have 
reviewed have endorsed this method, and it appears to be gaining support among 
legislators and election integrity activists around the country.14 
 
C. Polling Audit Model.  This model requires a randomly chosen, small sample of 
ballots be recounted in every precinct and that these tallies be compared to the 
unofficial electronic results.  We are not aware of any jurisdictions that have adopted 
this approach, though several election integrity advocates have endorsed it.15 
 
In the subsections below, we describe and evaluate each audit model in detail and provide 
specific recommendations (in addition to those already discussed supra at 5–8) for improving 
each one. 
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A. THE FIXED-PERCENTAGE AUDIT MODEL 
 
This model, embraced by most states that currently conduct audits, requires jurisdictions to 
randomly select a fixed percentage or a fixed number of precincts or machines to audit.  All 
voter-verifiable paper records for the selected precincts or machines are manually counted 
and compared to the electronic vote tallies. 
 
1. MODEL IMPLEMENTATION 
 
Because some variant of this audit model is used in at least fourteen states, we have several 
examples of how it can be implemented. 
 
The minimum fixed audit percentages have ranged from Utah’s audits of one percent of 
voting machines to Connecticut’s recent audit of twenty percent of precincts using optical 
scan voting machines.16  There is a considerable range between these extremes, though most 
states tend to fall at the lower end of the spectrum.  Aside from Hawaii, which requires an 
audit of ten percent of precincts, the other states that have adopted the fixed-percentage 
approach require minimum audits of five percent of precincts or machines, or less.17  In 
Minnesota, rather than specifying a percentage, the number of precincts to audit in each 
county depends on the number of registered voters: counties with fewer than 50,000 
registered voters must audit at least two precincts, while counties with more than 100,000 
registered voters must audit at least four precincts.18 
 
States also differ on the question of whether to audit precincts or individual voting 
machines.  The basic principle in both cases is the same: auditors must tally paper records 
and compare the results to the electronic tally for the recounted precinct or machine.  For 
the reasons explained by Howard Stanislevic in a paper on determining the proper size of an 
audit,19 a machine-level audit can produce the same confidence level as a precinct-level audit 
with a lower amount of effort.  (Alternatively, for the same level of effort, a machine-level 
audit can produce a higher confidence level than a precinct-level audit.)  Most states that 
conduct fixed-percentage audits do so at the precinct-level, though New York plans to 
conduct manual audits at the machine-level.20 
 
Another variable among these states is the number of contests reviewed in an audit.  
Connecticut, California, and Illinois check all of the races on a ballot during a post-election 
audit, which in California, can be as many as 200 races.21  In contrast, both Hawaii and New 
Mexico review just one race in an election during a post-election audit.22  Arizona requires 
jurisdictions to review at least 4 contested races, including one federal race, one statewide 
race, one ballot measure, and one legislative race.23 
 
Finally, states vary in how they select the precincts or machines to be audited.  In California, 
for instance, precincts are chosen at the county level, with little direction from the state as to 
how the precincts should be selected.24  By contrast, precincts are selected at the state level in 
Illinois.25   
 
As discussed infra at page 32, centralized audit selection can be more efficient and 
transparent.  By selecting precincts or machines to audit at the state level, counties are 
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relieved of this responsibility and associated administrative tasks.  Additionally, audit 
selection at the state level facilitates the selection of precincts to audit in election districts 
that cross jurisdictional boundaries.  Finally, public observers of random selection processes 
would be able to watch a single selection process, rather than attempt to watch multiple 
county selection processes around a state. 
 
State-level audit selection, however, carries some disadvantages.  Some states may be too 
large – geographically, or in terms of the number of precincts, or both – to select precincts 
in a reasonable amount of time during a single official event.  Selecting precincts or 
machines to audit in a central location might also make it difficult for local election officials 
and voters to observe the selection process for their own jurisdiction.  This could undermine 
the transparency that public audit selection should foster.  Finally, since audit selections 
should occur after all ballot types, including absentee and provisional ballots, have been 
counted, there is a risk that a single jurisdiction with a high proportion of these could hold 
up statewide audit selection. 
 
Regardless of whether a jurisdiction chooses to audit by precinct or machine, audit one 
percent or twenty percent, or select precincts or machines at the state or county level, there 
are certain procedures that must be implemented if this model is to be as effective and 
efficient as possible.  We discuss some of these procedures below. 
 
2. AUDIT MODEL STRENGTHS 
 
The fixed-percentage audit model should detect errors and fraud above a certain threshold 
(dependent on the size of the audit).  Assuming a low, single-digit percentage audit, this type 
of audit should easily detect a software bug or programming error that affects large numbers 
of votes on a large number of machines. 
 
Moreover, when an unexplained discrepancy between the paper records and electronic tallies 
is found, it should be fairly easy for election officials to identify the machine, race and/or 
ballot type affected by the discrepancy.  Thus, we can imagine a scenario where a software 
bug on certain DREs causes the machines to lose the electronic record of anyone who has 
voted on Spanish language ballots.  The direct comparison of paper records (which have not 
been lost) to electronic tallies should allow us to identify fairly quickly which types of ballots 
have been affected.  As discussed in greater detail below, this is not necessarily true of other 
audit methods (see infra at page 28). 
 
Finally, under this audit model, jurisdictions will have comparatively low and foreseeable 
administrative costs.  Because jurisdictions know in advance what percentage of precincts or 
machines will be audited, they may make the necessary logistical preparations for a post-
election audit, such as hiring auditors and determining how long the audits are likely to 
take.26 
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3. AUDIT MODEL WEAKNESSES 
 
While the fixed-percentage audit model has the benefits of detecting widespread 
discrepancies, yielding detailed information about their possible sources, and of imposing 
predictable costs and time requirements, it has two major weaknesses.  The first weakness 
has been identified in several academic papers: the closer a race is, the less likely this type of 
audit can provide confidence that a software bug, programming error, or malicious software 
attack did not alter the outcome of the election.27 
 
As an example of this first weakness, Table 1 illustrates the problem of low confidence levels 
in a typical Congressional district of 400 precincts which are assumed to be of roughly equal 
size for the purposes of simplicity.  We have assumed that this state mandates an audit of 
five percent of all precincts (as is the case, for example, in Illinois).  We have further 
assumed that if more than twenty percent of the ballots in any single jurisdiction were 
corrupted, election officials and the public would detect the corruption without an audit.  
This is a common assumption in academic literature on post-election audits.28 
 
TABLE 1. FIXED-PERCENTAGE AUDIT OF FIVE PERCENT OF PRECINCTS 
IN THE MODEL CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT 
 
No. of 
Precincts 
Margin of 
Victory
Confidence 
Level
400 5% 94%
400 2% 65%
400 1% 40%
 
Note: If a Congressional District has fewer than 400 precincts, confidence levels will be 
significantly lower.  If precinct size varies within a Congressional District, it will be more 
difficult to obtain a high level of confidence in the results, unless precinct selection is 
weighted by the number of voters in each precinct.29  Weighted precinct sampling is 
discussed in greater detail infra at page 25. 
 
The numbers in Table 1 were calculated assuming a two-person race, where “margin of 
victory” is determined by subtracting the total votes for the loser from the total votes for the 
winner, and dividing by the total number of ballots cast and counted.  The smaller the 
margin of victory, the less confidence we have that the five percent audit will catch a 
software bug, programming error, or malicious software attack that could have altered the 
results of an election.  The reason for this is simple: in a race decided by more than five 
percent of the vote, a software bug, malicious attack, or programming error will have to 
affect a large number of votes to change the outcome of the election.  A five percent audit 
should catch such an error that affects a large number of votes.  In contrast, in a race 
decided by only one percent of the votes, a software bug, malicious attack, or programming 
error will only have to corrupt a small number of votes to change the outcome.  In this case, 
there is a small chance that we would find the corrupt machines or precincts if we audited 
only five percent of them. 
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In the discussion above, we have assumed that the Congressional district in question is 
contained within a single election jurisdiction.  In practice, many Congressional districts span 
multiple counties, which are, in turn, responsible for administering their own elections.  In 
such cases, counties will be sampling from an even smaller number of precincts than a 
jurisdiction would sample if it selected from the entire Congressional district, without regard 
to county borders.  Sampling a fixed percentage of this smaller (county-based) number of 
precincts will produce an even lower confidence level than the numbers discussed above. 
 
ADDRESSING THE PROBLEM OF LOW CONFIDENCE LEVELS 
 
Princeton University Professor Andrew Appel and others have proposed a remedy to the 
problem of low confidence levels produced by a fixed-percentage audit: allow candidates 
to select additional precincts or machines to be audited.30  This practice of non-random and 
“targeted” auditing is common in the financial industry and other areas where government 
has an interest in ensuring honest reporting.31  It is already effectively enshrined in law in 
some states, such as New Hampshire and North Dakota, where candidates can ask for 
recounts in some or all precincts at little or no cost.32 
 
We endorse this suggestion for all elections, as it would serve two confidence-building 
purposes.  First, it would give greater assurance to candidates and their supporters that the 
election results are correct.  Second, it would allow candidates to receive audits of results 
that seem anomalous and might suggest a programming error or miscount.  Given the low 
confidence levels produced by fixed-percentage audits of close elections, this 
recommendation is particularly important. 
 
Another potential remedy to this weakness would be to increase the level of audits in very 
close races.  Several states that conduct fixed-percentage audits require a full recount of 
paper records when the margin of victory between the two leading candidates is very small.  
Connecticut automatically requires a recanvass of voting machine returns and absentee 
ballots if the margin of victory between the top two candidates is less than twenty votes or 
less than one half of one percent of the total votes cast for the office in question (up to 
2,000 votes).33  In Arizona, if the margin between the two top candidates is equal to or less 
than one tenth of one percent of the number of votes cast for both candidates, a full recount 
for the affected office will occur.34  How to implement this remedy is discussed in greater 
detail in the next section of this paper “The Adjustable-Percentage Audit Model” infra at 
page 19. 
 
ACTING ON DISCREPANCIES 
 
The second weakness of the fixed-percentage audit model is that discrepancies that may 
seem minor (e.g., a three-vote discrepancy between the paper records and electronic tallies in 
a particular precinct) could indicate far larger problems.  This model will be effective only if 
investigations and additional action are initiated when discrepancies between the paper 
records and electronic tallies are found. 
 
The discovery of any discrepancy should prompt two actions.  First, additional manual 
counts should occur to confirm the existence of discrepancies.  Of the states that have laws 
or regulations relating to audit discrepancies, only eight require additional audits when such 
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discrepancies are discovered, and those requirements for further action vary widely.35  Hawaii 
audit law requires additional auditing if discrepancies are found, but does not describe how 
the additional auditing should be conducted.36  In Minnesota, a difference greater than one 
half of one percent between the result of a manual audit and the electronic tally triggers the 
auditing of at least three additional precincts in the affected jurisdiction.  If the discrepancy 
persists, the county auditor must review ballots in the rest of the county.37  In New Mexico, a 
difference between the manual count and electronic tally greater than one and one half 
percent triggers a recount of ballots cast for the affected office in the legislative district 
where the discrepancy occurred.38  In Arizona, discrepancies between the paper records and 
the electronic vote tallies equal to or greater than a “designated margin” trigger a second 
manual count.  If after a second manual count discrepancies equal to or greater than the 
accepted “designated margin” persist, the audit is expanded to include twice as many 
precincts, randomly selected by lot.39 
 
Some discrepancies between paper and electronic counts may be caused by human counting 
errors or by different interpretations of voter intent by a human counter and a voting 
machine.  Although discrepancies are not necessarily proof that there was widespread fraud 
or error, as the Brennan Center Task Force on Voting System Security noted in The Machinery 
of Democracy, they can indicate a much larger problem with the election.40  As such indicators, 
discrepancies should trigger other types of action by election officials. 
 
Our second recommendation for acting on discrepancies is to investigate their causes and to 
respond appropriately to investigation findings.41  For example, in Minnesota, if a voting 
system is found to have failed to record votes accurately and in the manner provided by the 
Minnesota election law, the voting system must not be used at another election until it has 
been examined and recertified by the Secretary of State.  If the voting system failure is 
attributable to either its design or to actions of the vendor, the vendor must forfeit the 
vendor bond and the performance bond as required by Minnesota law.42 
 
Generally, our review of state laws and interviews with election officials revealed that the 
majority of jurisdictions do not have adequate, detailed, and practical procedures for action 
to be taken when unexplained discrepancies are found.  Jurisdictions should conduct a 
transparent investigation of all machines where the paper records and electronic tallies do 
not match to try to determine the cause of any discrepancies.  In particular, especially for 
DREs, an investigation should include a review of the software code, as discrepancies may 
have been caused by a software bug or programming error.  As in Illinois, the “State Board 
of Elections, State’s Attorney and other appropriate law enforcement agencies, the county 
leader of each political party, and qualified civic organizations” should be notified of the 
discrepancies and have an opportunity to send observers to the investigation.43  Additionally, 
election officials should create a “discrepancy log” in which to list all discrepancies, identify 
the precinct and machine where they occurred, describe their causes, and record any actions 
taken in response to them.  The discrepancy log and the findings of any investigation should 
be made available to the public.  The adoption of these two practices would significantly 
strengthen the fixed-percentage audit model’s ability to serve as an effective 
countermeasure to outcome-changing fraud or error. 
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4. ADMINISTRATIVE CONSIDERATIONS 
 
TIME AND COST OF AUDIT 
 
Because the number of precincts or machines audited rarely changes significantly from one 
election to the next, the time and cost of fixed-percentage audits should remain stable over 
time.  These factors should only change significantly if discrepancies trigger additional audits.  
Determinants of the time and cost of an audit include: the percentage of precincts or 
machines audited, the number of persons staffing the audit, and the number of races 
audited. 
 
State reporting of the amount of time it takes to complete an audit varies.  Counties in 
Illinois report that five percent audits of ten to twelve races in an election generally take 
anywhere between two hours to two days.44  In Hawaii, an audit of ten percent of precincts 
for a single race is generally completed in less than a week.45  In Clark County, Nevada, 
where officials audited dozens of races in two percent of precincts in 2006, the audit was 
completed in just a few days.46  In Los Angeles County, California, it has generally taken 
close to twenty-eight days to select and audit one percent of all of the contests in a general 
election (since 2000, that number has been anywhere between 134 and 194 contests).47 
 
The largest component of a fixed-percentage audit’s cost is likely to be associated with 
managing and staffing the audit.  If states hope to achieve accurate audit results using best 
practices applied consistently, the preponderance of the costs of audits is likely to lie in 
recruiting, paying, and training quality management and covering travel costs – at least in 
initial years.  These costs will vary, depending on the number of auditors required to 
complete the audit and the magnitude of any financial compensation.  During Hawaii’s ten 
percent audit of a single race in 2006, the smallest county required seven auditors while the 
largest county required forty-five.48  In many cases, jurisdictions use election workers already 
on their payroll to avoid incurring additional staffing costs.49  A typical hand count on 
election night in 2006 in Walpole, New Hampshire involved nine two-person teams and 
three managers to count 1,574 ballots, with each ballot having the equivalent of 14 
contests.50 
 
Despite this variance, for all cases where we have been able to review actual cost data, the 
overall cost of a fixed-percentage audit has been surprisingly low compared to what is 
already spent by jurisdictions on elections.  Unfortunately, comparing the costs of one 
jurisdiction to the next is difficult because jurisdictions report costs differently, some on a 
per ballot basis and others on a per precinct basis.  In North Carolina’s first audit in 2006, 
the average cost of the audit of a single race in 260 precincts was sixty-five dollars per 
precinct.51  In November 2006, Minnesota examined three contests in 202 precincts at an 
estimated cost of $135 per precinct.52  Pima County, Arizona examined four contests in each 
of nine precincts, plus additional provisional ballots, for a little over thirteen cents per 
ballot.53  Had they paid the market rate of $7-10 per hour for counters and $20 per hour for 
managers, the 2006 Walpole, New Hampshire election night hand count of 1,574 fourteen-
race ballots, with nine two-person counting teams, would cost about four cents per ballot, 
per race.54 
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THE CHALLENGE OF MATCHING PAPER AND ELECTRONIC RECORDS 
 
Counting paper records presents at least two related problems.  The first is that people often 
miscount.  Consequently, there are going to be many instances where the hand count of 
paper records and the electronic tally do not match, not because there was a problem with 
the machines, but because the auditors made mistakes counting.  There has been very little 
research evaluating different methods of hand-counting, but we discuss directions such 
research should take in the “Directions for the Future” section of this paper infra at page 40. 
 
Several jurisdictions partially address the problem of miscounting by having at least two 
people count the same paper record.55  For example, San Mateo County, California uses a 
team of four people to conduct their post-election audit.56  One person reads and announces 
the contents of a given paper record, another observes that the paper record has been 
announced correctly and two people record a running tally of votes for each contest.  The 
recorders announce the end of each ten-vote increment, at which point the team checks for 
errors in the tally.  If the team finds an error, the counting process can be rolled back to the 
last point of agreement.57 
 
Minnesota provides an example of how incremental checking during post-election audits 
works in practice.  Minnesota law requires election judges to count the votes for each race or 
ballot question by creating piles of voted ballots for each candidate in a race and piles for 
blank or defective responses.58  Election judges check the sorted piles of ballots for the 
particular race or question to ensure that all ballots have been placed in the correct pile.  
Ballots may be stacked in groups of twenty-five crosswise.59  After the final count for the 
race or question is completed, all ballots are returned to a single pile and the process is 
repeated for the subsequent race or ballot question. 
 
The second, related problem is that auditors are likely to want the paper records to match the 
electronic records.  The problems in Cuyahoga County, Ohio in 2004, where audit 
supervisors rigged the ballot selection so that no discrepancies would be found, exemplify 
the danger of auditors hoping to find perfect matches and to avoid the difficult questions 
and additional work that might result if the records do not match.60 
 
To counter the understandable temptation to make the paper and electronic records match, 
we recommend against revealing the unofficial electronic election results to the individuals 
performing the manual count.  The audit teams should not have access to the unofficial 
results; an audit supervisor or election official can serve as a buffer and inform each team if 
their audit results match the unofficial electronic results, without revealing the magnitude or 
direction of any deviation.  If the manual count does not match the electronic results, the 
audit team should conduct additional “blind” recounts of the records of affected races.61  
This practice need not prevent elections officials from freezing and publishing unofficial 
election results prior to conducting the audits; it merely means that auditors should not be 
made aware of the vote tallies on the particular machines they are auditing. 
 
Manual counts may sometimes reveal different voter intent than machine counts of ballots.  
Overvotes, marginal marks, hesitation marks, and other stray markings on manually marked 
ballots could cause optical scan voting machines to misinterpret voter intent that a human 
reviewer would be able to discern.  This may lead to deviations or explained discrepancies 
POST-ELECTION AUDITS: RESTORING TRUST IN ELECTIONS 16 
when auditing optical scan paper ballots.  Fortunately, these discrepancies are easy to 
recognize and account for, so they should not cause any serious problem; they qualify as an 
explained discrepancy and need not trigger any kind of recount or additional audit, except in 
the case of an extremely close race. 
 
OTHER FACTORS 
 
Jurisdictions that use DREs with voter-verifiable paper records may face an extra challenge 
in sorting paper records by precinct prior to auditing, creating additional costs.  Some 
jurisdictions locate precincts with different ballots in a single polling place.  Voting machines 
in a polling place may be programmed to store and enable multiple precinct ballot layouts, 
allowing voters of different precincts to cast ballots on a single machine.  As a result, the 
polling place’s set of voter-verifiable paper records will need to be carefully sorted by 
precinct so that the records for a precinct selected for auditing will not include records 
corresponding to other precincts.  Alternatively, if a precinct in a multiple-precinct polling 
place is selected for an audit, election officials can automatically add the other precincts in 
the polling place to the audit to avoid the costs of sorting records. 
 
An additional consideration for all audit methods is the quality of the voter-verifiable paper 
records.  A widely reported problem with the current generation of DREs outfitted with 
voter-verifiable paper record printers is that some of the records are unreadable.  For 
example, in Cuyahoga County, Ohio’s May 2006 primary election, ten percent of the paper 
records were unreadable due to paper jams and other printer malfunctions.62  A high 
proportion of spoiled voter-verifiable paper records could have significant negative 
consequences on an audit’s effectiveness.  Quantifying the impact of spoiled paper records is 
beyond the scope of this paper, but a qualitative example might be helpful.  Spoiled paper 
records could effectively hide discrepancies and thus allow a greater proportion of 
discrepancies per precinct to go undetected.  For an adjustable-percentage audit (discussed 
infra at page 19), this would lead to an underestimate of the audit size.  More generally, 
spoiled voter-verifiable paper records could drown out the effect of more subtle voting 
system errors, frustrating the goal of collecting data about voting machine performance 
during audits. 
 
5. RECOMMENDATIONS TO IMPROVE THE MODEL 
 
In addition to the general recommendations for all audit models made in the “Audit Best 
Practices” section on page 30 and which we strongly reiterate here, we also make the 
following recommendation to strengthen the fixed-percentage model: 
 
• Implement Effective Procedures for Acting on Seemingly Small 
Discrepancies.  If audits are to have a real deterrent effect, jurisdictions must adopt 
clear procedures for addressing audit discrepancies when they are found. As noted in 
The Machinery of Democracy, a seemingly minor discrepancy between paper and 
electronic records (of even just a few votes) could indicate far more serious 
problems.63 Without protocols for responding to discrepancies, the detection of 
fraud or error will not prevent them from occurring again.  Such protocols should 
include a required review of system software code. 
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Furthermore, given the low-confidence levels that a fixed-percentage audit will sometimes 
produce, we highlight the following recommendation for the fixed-percentage model in 
particular: 
 
• Allow Candidates To Select Precincts or Machines To Be Audited.  In addition 
to using random selection procedures, jurisdictions should allow candidates to pick 
at least one precinct or machine to be audited.  This practice would allow candidates 
to receive audits of results that seem anomalous to them and give greater assurance 
that the election results are correct. 
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B. THE ADJUSTABLE-PERCENTAGE AUDIT MODEL 
 
The adjustable-percentage audit model attempts to address the problem of low confidence 
levels in close races produced by the fixed-percentage audit model.  This audit model 
requires a state or local jurisdiction to determine what percentage of precincts or machines 
to audit for each race based on the size of the margin of victory between the two leading 
candidates.  The smaller the margin of victory, the larger the percentage of precincts or 
machines that will need to be audited.  The mathematics behind this method involves 
calculating a sample size given the margin in the closest race on the ballot and a desired 
confidence level for detecting error or fraud.64 
 
Many recent academic articles endorse variants of the adjustable-percentage audit model – 
often in conjunction with adjustments for variations in number of voters in different units 
(e.g., precincts or machines) – and it appears to be gaining currency among legislators and 
election integrity activists around the country.65  Congressman Rush Holt proposed a 
variation of the adjustable-percentage audit model in the “Voter Confidence and 
Increased Accessibility Act of 2007,” which currently has support from more than a majority 
in the U.S. House of Representatives.66  Legislators and chief election officials in several 
states are also considering adoption of similar audit methods. 
 
1. MODEL IMPLEMENTATION 
 
The goal of an adjustable-percentage audit is to reach a minimum level of “confidence.”  
In this context, confidence refers to a measure of the probability that a full recount of the 
voter-verifiable paper records would not change the outcome of an election.  To make this 
determination, a jurisdiction will need to know a few things: the number of precincts or 
machines to be audited, the variation in the number of votes per precinct or machine, the 
unofficial margin of victory, and the confidence level or “statistical power” the jurisdiction 
would like to achieve.67 
 
With this information and the use of scientifically reasonable assumptions (discussed in 
detail below at page 20), election officials (with the assistance of statisticians, where 
necessary) can determine how many precincts or machines to audit to reach a desired 
minimum level of confidence.  To illustrate this more concretely, consider the meaning of an 
adjustable-percentage audit that yields a ninety-five percent confidence level: holding the 
assumptions discussed below as true, if an outcome-changing level of error or fraud exists, 
there is a ninety-five percent chance that this audit will detect it (and, accordingly, a five 
percent chance that it will not).  An audit designed to give a fifty percent confidence level 
would have an equal chance of finding and not finding such error or fraud. 
 
An adjustable-percentage audit can be implemented in several different ways.  We discuss 
two of the most commonly suggested methods below. 
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AUDITS OF ADDITIONAL PRECINCTS OR MACHINES IN CLOSE RACES 
 
One implementation of the adjustable-percentage audit model is similar to the 
implementation of the fixed-percentage audit model discussed earlier.  If a state requires an 
audit of a minimum percentage of precincts or machines, selection can begin at the state or 
county level as soon as the unofficial results are frozen and published.  For any close races, 
election officials will select additional precincts to audit to achieve a desired level of 
confidence.  We note that many states that currently have fixed-percentage audit laws 
specify a minimum percentage to be audited, and could implement adjustable-percentage 
audits without running afoul of these laws. 
 
The determination of how many additional precincts to select in close races (and their 
subsequent selection mechanism) is a challenge that is unique to this model.  We examine 
below how a state-level entity could select additional precincts in federal races with small 
margins of victory.  We discuss this arrangement, which deviates from most states’ county 
(or other jurisdiction)-based procedures for two reasons.  First, a centralized procedure may 
ease the coordination of public observation of random selection processes by allowing 
observers to witness one selection process at the state level, rather than attempt to witness 
dozens of county-level procedures.  Second, the Voter Confidence and Increased 
Accessibility Act of 2007, mentioned above, would require state-level selection of precincts 
or machines for an audit. 
 
For audits of close races, the selection of additional precincts over the minimum percentage 
would work as follows: shortly after the polls close, county election officials would compile 
the final unofficial election results for all precincts and forward their county-level results to 
state election officials (as is already done in some states, such as California).  State election 
officials would then determine the unofficial margin of victory in each race and use a 
confidence-based audit algorithm (discussed below) or table to determine the number of 
additional precincts that must be audited for each election. State election officials would then 
randomly select the determined number of additional precincts to audit and notify each 
county. The county would then audit all of the races in the selected precincts.  More detailed 
suggestions on the selection of additional precincts in close races for audits can be found in 
Appendix B. 
 
TIERED AUDIT LEVELS BASED ON MARGINS OF VICTORY 
 
Congressman Holt’s legislation proposes a variation of the adjustable-percentage audit–a 
“tiered” approach.  For all federal races decided by a five percent margin or greater, an audit 
of three percent of precincts would automatically occur.  For federal races decided by less 
than a two percent margin, the number of precincts audited will increase from three percent 
to five percent.  When a race is decided by less than a one percent margin, ten percent of a 
Congressional district’s precincts will be audited. 
 
We can see how this tiered approach can increase confidence levels by returning to our 
model Congressional district, introduced in the previous section of this paper on fixed-
percentage audits.  We make the same assumptions as we did before, namely, that there are 
400 precincts in the Congressional district of roughly equal size, and a vote shift of more 
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than twenty percent in any precinct would be easily identified, deemed suspicious, and 
investigated, regardless of any mandated audit. 
 
In this example, we will look at the tiered audit as proposed in Congressman Holt’s bill.  The 
highlighted numbers represent the confidence level achieved by the proposal. 
 
TABLE 2. ADJUSTABLE-PERCENTAGE AUDIT MODEL: 
TIERED AUDITS OF PRECINCTS IN THE MODEL CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT 
 
No. of 
Precincts 
Margin of 
Victory 
Confidence in 
a 2% Audit
Confidence in 
a 3%Audit
Confidence in 
a 5% Audit 
Confidence in 
a 10% Audit 
400 0.75% 15% 22% 34% 58%
400 1.75% 31% 43% 61% 86%
400 5.00% 66% 80% 94% 99%
 
The numbers in Table 2 were calculated assuming a two-person race, where “margin of 
victory” is determined by subtracting the total votes for the loser from the total votes for the 
winner, and dividing by the total number of ballots cast, including undervoted ballots and 
ballots disqualified in that race.  Jurisdictions would have greater confidence that result-
changing errors were caught by an adjustable-percentage audit than by a fixed-
percentage audit because the audit level increases as the margin of victory shrinks. 
 
As some commentators have noted, where Congressional districts have fewer than 400 
precincts, or where precincts vary substantially in size,68 these confidence levels will decrease 
across the board.  In practice, determining the number of precincts that must be audited 
would require a specific calculation that takes into account the distribution (i.e., actual votes 
per precinct) in the given Congressional district.  Nevertheless, the basic concept remains 
true: by increasing the audit percentage in close races, we gain greater confidence that result-
changing errors will be caught.69 
 
TABLE 3. PREDICTED IMPACT OF A TIERED ADJUSTABLE-PERCENTAGE 
AUDIT REQUIREMENT ON FEDERAL RACES (2002 – 2006) 
 
Year 
Federal Races 
Requiring a 3% Audit 
(Margin of Victory 
Greater than 2%)
Federal Races 
Requiring a 5% Audit 
(Margin of Victory 
Between 1% and 2%)
Federal Races 
Requiring a 10% Audit 
(Margin of Victory 
Between 0% and 1%)
2002 461 3 4
2004 510 5 5
2006 451 7 10
 
Table 3 shows the predicted impact of a tiered audit in 2002, 2004, and 2006.  “Federal 
races” includes all Congressional races and Presidential races in the fifty states and the 
District of Columbia.  Although a tiered audit adds some complexity to the process, it would 
probably not add significantly to the cost of conducting the audits – at least if only applied to 
federal races.  The cost of a tiered audit as proposed in Congressman Holt’s bill would be 
negligibly greater than a flat audit of three percent because few races would be subject to a 
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five or ten percent audit.  The extra cost of performing some audits in the second and third 
tier thus contributes about one-thirtieth of the total audit cost.70  Tiered audits also increase 
the public’s confidence that election results are correctly reported for all races – even close 
races. 
 
THE CONFIDENCE LEVEL ALGORITHM 
 
To more precisely set the confidence level, some have advocated following a mathematical 
algorithm that would guarantee a fixed level of confidence (e.g., fifty percent, ninety percent, 
or ninety-five percent) that a full recount of the paper records would not find error or fraud, 
if present at a level that would change the outcome of the race being audited.71 
 
In implementing such a method, states might require the assistance of statisticians to review 
the outcome of various races and tell counties how many precincts or machines they need to 
audit based on the review.  To perform this calculation, election officials would need to 
know not only the unofficial vote totals, but also the number of precincts or machines in 
which ballots were cast in the race, as well as the variation in the number of ballots cast in 
those precincts or on those machines.72  In Percentage-Based Versus S.A.F.E. Vote Tabulation 
Auditing: A Graphic Comparison, several statisticians and political scientists provide an in-depth 
analysis of how this method could be implemented and detail its various advantages.73 
 
A potential advantage of this approach over the tiered audit percentage approach is that 
jurisdictions will not have to audit more precincts or machines than is necessary to gain 
confidence that the electronic results have the correct candidate winning.  For races that are 
not close, setting the audit size based on confidence level will likely reduce the audit size 
significantly from the effort required under a mandatory fixed-percentage audit of two or 
three percent. 
 
2. MODEL STRENGTHS 
 
In addition to the advantage of greater confidence (albeit with greater effort) in close races, 
the adjustable-percentage audit model has many of same strengths as the fixed-
percentage audit model. 
 
As already discussed, the adjustable-percentage audit model has one major advantage over 
the fixed-percentage audit model: it will give jurisdictions and the public greater confidence 
that there was no error, bug, or attack against the voting system that could change the 
outcome of a close race, and it will do so more efficiently than requiring a fixed-percentage 
audit of a large number of precincts or machines in all races with no regard to the margin of 
victory between candidates. 
 
3. MODEL WEAKNESSES 
 
We have identified three major weaknesses of the adjustable-percentage audit model, one 
of which is shared with the fixed-percentage audit model.  As discussed above, audits are 
effective only if election officials act on the discovery of discrepancies between manual 
count results and the electronic tally, and even with adjustable-percentage audits, a seemingly 
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innocuous discrepancy of just a few votes between paper and electronic records in one or 
two precincts could, in fact, indicate far more serious problems. 
 
As recommended in the previous section on the fixed-percentage audit model, when 
discrepancies are found, election officials should conduct additional manual counts of the 
paper records, investigate the sources of discrepancies, and resolve them.  If appropriate, the 
election officials should order an expanded recount. 
 
Prior to an election, election officials should determine the size of a discrepancy that 
warrants further recounts or other action.  It may not be clear how much of a discrepancy 
should trigger such actions.  An analysis of states with trigger mechanisms could provide 
guidelines.  For example, in Minnesota, the discrepancy rate was one half of one percent, but 
no counties were actually required to perform additional audits.74  Although small 
discrepancies may be unavoidable, ignoring them may result in ignoring outcome-changing 
problems.  While additional experience with audits will help to inform the expectations of 
election officials, jurisdictions should devise plans for acting on discrepancies. 
 
The second weakness of this model is that election officials face uncertainty about the audit 
prior to an election.  The number of precincts a jurisdiction must audit is based on a 
mathematical formula that relies in part on the unofficial electronic results totaled after the 
polls have closed.  As a result, election officials may not know how many precincts or 
machines they will have to audit until Election Day is over.  In some high profile state and 
federal races, election officials could use pre-election polls to assist them in estimating what 
level of auditing scrutiny might be necessary when the unofficial results are reported.  Of 
course, for many races and issues on a given ballot, there will be little, if any, recent public 
polling data to assist election officials in making such estimates. 
 
The percent of precincts or machines to be audited could vary from one hundredth of one 
percent to a full recount.  The tiered audit approach attempts to limit this uncertainty by 
providing acceptable minimum audit sizes (i.e., three, five, or ten percent of precincts).75  
Given how infrequently federal races are decided by small margins, it will be relatively rare 
that election officials would be required to conduct the “stepped-up” audits in federal 
elections. 
 
The tiered approach partially addresses this concern by allowing election officials to plan and 
budget for audits by providing some certainty about audit levels prior to an election.  Such 
certainty does not exist for other variations of the adjustable-percentage audit model.  The 
public and losing candidates, however, could feel less confident in the results of very close 
races.  For instance, in our model Congressional district, a ten percent audit of a close race 
(the maximum audit rate under the Holt proposal) will only have a fifty-eight percent chance 
of finding an error or fraud that could alter the outcome of a race decided by three-quarters 
of one percent (and even less of a chance of discovering smaller errors or fraud).  In actual 
Congressional districts with fewer than 400 precincts or where the number of votes cast in 
precincts varies greatly, the chances of finding such an error would be even smaller. 
 
Finally, if a jurisdiction adopts an adjustable-percentage audit model without a base percentage 
or number of audits for all races, it will likely miss some errors or problems with voting machines 
that a fixed-percentage audit might catch when there are no close races.  Moreover, 
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without such a minimum audit, election officials are less likely to record, review, and make 
publicly available information about the votes cast in an election that could assist them in 
improving the performance of their machines and ballot design in the future.  Thus we can 
imagine a situation where a poor ballot design led a significant number of voters to 
undervote or cancel their votes upon examining the final DRE review screen, or where a 
significant number of votes were misread as undervotes because some pens supplied at 
polling places were not read by the optical scanners.  These problems might not be 
substantial enough to change the outcome of a landslide victory; an audit of just one or a 
few machines in such landslide races might be all that was necessary to ensure that a winning 
candidate actually won his race, but such a limited audit is unlikely to reveal the kinds of 
problems that could presage greater problems if not caught and corrected for future, closer 
elections. 
 
Accordingly, jurisdictions that implement an adjustable-percentage audit model should 
audit a minimum percentage or number of precincts or machines automatically. 
 
4. ADMINISTRATIVE CONSIDERATIONS 
 
Adjustable-percentage audits are more complex than fixed-percentage audits, and 
because jurisdictions have little experience with the adjustable-percentage audits, there are 
few well-tested procedures.  It may be challenging to train staff of an adjustable-
percentage audit, opening opportunities for human errors. 
 
TIME AND COST OF AUDIT 
 
The cost of conducting an adjustable-percentage audit depends heavily on which races are 
being audited and the margins of victory in those races.  Obviously, if there are many close 
races, a larger percentage of precincts and machines would be audited.  On the other hand, 
this audit method promises to handle audit costs efficiently and fairly.  Where races are 
decided by large margins, it will not be necessary to audit many precincts to obtain a high 
level of confidence that a full recount would not change the election outcome.  Only close 
races would require a large percentage of precincts or machines to be audited.  If a state or 
the federal government has a role in paying for audits, it would be able to distribute the 
savings in large-margin (i.e., small audit size) jurisdictions to those with small-margin races 
that must conduct large audits. 
 
The major administrative burden associated with the adjustable-percentage audit model 
may not be the cost of performing the audits, but the cost of planning for an audit when the 
number of precincts that might be audited is unknown.  The necessity of planning for a large 
audit might lead jurisdictions to incur expenses for resources (e.g., work space, staffing, etc.) 
that they ultimately do not use. 
 
The adjustable-percentage audit model also may impose unequal financial burdens on 
election jurisdictions.  A jurisdiction that happens to have a race where the two leading 
candidates are separated by a narrow margin will incur greater expenses than a jurisdiction in 
which the margin for the same race is relatively wide.  Therefore, from a system-wide 
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perspective, it might be necessary to distribute funds on the state or national level to 
adequately fund jurisdictions that have close races. 
 
OTHER FACTORS 
 
As discussed in the fixed-percentage audit model section, the voter-verifiable paper records 
produced by printer attachments to current DRE voting machine models present unique 
challenges for jurisdictions that use them.  Paper records spoiled by paper jams and printer 
malfunctions could effectively mask discrepancies.  For an adjustable-percentage audit, 
this would lead to an underestimate of the audit size.  More generally, spoiled voter-verifiable 
paper records could drown out the effect of more subtle voting system errors, frustrating the 
goal of collecting data about voting machine performance during audits. 
 
5. RECOMMENDATIONS TO IMPROVE THE MODEL 
 
We encourage jurisdictions considering this model to adopt the general recommendations 
(infra at page 30) and recommendations to improve the fixed-percentage audit model (supra 
at page 17) made in this paper.  In addition, we recommend and/or reiterate the following to 
jurisdictions that adopt an adjustable-percentage audit model: 
 
• Audit a Minimum Percentage or Number of Precincts or Machines for Each 
Election, Including At Least One Machine Model and/or Precinct in Each 
County.  One of the chief benefits of the adjustable-percentage audit model is 
that it allows jurisdictions to reach a relatively high level of confidence that a full 
recount would not change the outcome of an election in a very efficient manner (i.e., 
by auditing just enough precincts, machines or other units to ensure that the desired 
level of confidence is reached).  Jurisdictions employing this model might be tempted 
to audit only one or very few precincts or machines in elections decided by large 
margins, but doing so would sacrifice several important post-election audit goals 
related to improving future performance (and, relatedly, the ability to fix problems 
that could have a greater impact on election outcomes in close races in the future).  
This includes detecting significant errors that would not change the result of an 
election, errors that only affect a particular machine model or ballot-type, and errors 
that might shed light on how voters interact with certain ballot designs.  Accordingly, 
we recommend that jurisdictions employing this method also audit a minimum 
percentage or number of precincts or machines, including at least one machine 
model and/or precinct in each county. 
 
• Account for Precinct Size Variability in Audit Selection and Sample Size 
Calculations.  Methods to deal with precinct size variability can be as simple as 
sorting precincts into bins of certain sizes (“small,” “medium,” and “large”), 
conducting random selection within each bin or listing precincts in order of size, and 
ensuring that auditors select a certain number of large precincts.  Any analysis, 
legislation, or administrative procedures that do not take into account the varying 
number of votes in different precincts are likely to over-estimate the statistical power 
of uncovering irregularities that could change the outcome of an election. 
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C. THE POLLING AUDIT MODEL 
 
In contrast to the fixed-percentage and adjustable-percentage audit models, where all of 
the paper records for a given number of precincts or machines are manually counted in their 
entirety, there is another class of post-election auditing proposals that we refer to as 
instances of a “polling” model.76 
 
Under this model, a randomly chosen, small sample of ballots is recounted in every precinct 
and the total of these samples is compared to the unofficial electronic results.  We are not 
aware of any jurisdictions that have adopted this approach, though some election integrity 
advocates have developed arguments for this audit method.77 
 
1. MODEL IMPLEMENTATION 
 
In practice, election officials would conduct a polling audit on election night after the polls 
close or on the following day.  Audit teams would randomly select a small percentage of all 
paper records in each precinct.  The auditors in each precinct would manually count the 
votes in each race for these sampled records, and a jurisdiction- or state-level official would 
then total the precinct-level results together.  According to the statistical model on which 
this proposal relies, the hand-counted sample should provide a highly accurate and precise 
projection of the full electronic tally of the votes (unless that count has been corrupted).  
The proportion of votes for each candidate in each race of the sampled ballots should very 
nearly match the proportion of votes for each candidate in the full electronic tally.  More 
specifically, Jonathan D. Simon and Bruce O’Dell, the authors of this proposal, argue that a 
tally based on a random sample of ten percent of ballots would be within one percent of the 
full electronic tally ninety-nine percent of the time.  In their view, a deviation in the sample 
count of more than one percent would indicate that the full electronic tally was inaccurate.  
 
The polling audit model presents a few logistical considerations that are quite different from 
the fixed-percentage and adjustable-percentage audit methods discussed above.  First, 
because a polling audit examines individual paper records rather than voting machines or 
precincts, auditors will likely need to select far more records under this model. 
 
Second, all paper records must have an equal chance of being selected for the recount.  
Auditors must select the paper records at random, otherwise, the sample of paper records 
could be biased.  For example, selecting the first ten percent of paper records cast could lead 
to a sample of paper records from voters whose decision to vote early in the day is 
correlated with certain political preferences.  A projection of the full vote tally based on this 
sample would reflect this bias and accordingly might fall outside the margin of error and call 
the official results into question.  In other words, a failure to draw a random sample of paper 
records could lead to a falsely positive identification of a significant discrepancy between the 
paper records and the full electronic tally.  As was the case with the fixed-percentage and 
adjustable-percentage audit methods, the polling audit must include all ballot types.  
Excluding certain kinds of ballots (e.g., absentee ballots, provisional ballots) would bias the 
audit sample and leave open several opportunities to attack the official count.  
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Third, a jurisdiction must develop a means to identify and retrieve the paper records that the 
auditors randomly select.  A conceptually simple method for achieving this end is to mark 
each paper record with a unique number, and to randomly select paper records from that set 
of numbers. For paper ballots, such as those read by optical scanners, this process is likely to 
be straightforward, since the marking process basically amounts to stamping consecutive 
sheets of paper with sequential numbers.78  For DREs, which typically use continuous paper 
rolls for voter-verifiable paper records, the marking and retrieval process could be extremely 
cumbersome.79  To mark individual ballot records on these paper rolls would require 
scrolling through the entire roll, identifying the boundaries of each record, and stamping a 
number on the record.  In any event, this step must occur after ballots are cast in order to 
avoid compromising ballot secrecy. 
 
The second and third requirements are in some tension with a fourth consideration: a 
polling audit should occur as soon as possible following an election.  The polling audit 
model is principally intended to address the threat of intentional tampering with centralized 
ballot-counting equipment in order to produce a desired outcome.80  To avoid detection, 
attackers would need to rig the sampling of paper records or corrupt the manual count 
results of the sampled paper records in order to bring it within the desired margin of error of 
the full official count.  Using publicly verifiable random selection processes and conducting 
an audit in public mitigate this kind of threat.  In addition, authors of the polling audit 
proposal suggest conducting the audits in precincts rather than at a central location.81  
According to the proposal’s authors, such a widely distributed audit would require attackers 
to rely on a larger number of co-conspirators, making it more difficult to maintain the 
secrecy of an attack and successfully complete it.  Finally, the effects of conducting a widely 
distributed audit on the accuracy of the manual count are unclear; comparing the error rate 
for this audit design to a centrally conducted audit is an area that may warrant further 
research. 
 
2. MODEL STRENGTHS 
 
We have identified two major benefits of the polling audit model.  First, it promises to allow 
jurisdictions to confirm that the correct candidate has been declared the unofficial winner 
with a great degree of certainty without requiring jurisdictions to manually count a very large 
number of ballots.  This is true in close races as well. 
 
Second, unlike the fixed-percentage and adjustable-percentage audit models discussed 
above, the polling audit model would greatly reduce the need to decide whether a 
discrepancy is large enough to justify additional action. The hand count will or will not 
produce a result within one percent of the full electronic tally.  If it does, Simon and O’Dell 
argue, we can be ninety-nine percent confident that the electronic tally was correct.  On the 
other hand, if the hand count results are not within one percent of the full electronic results, 
a full recount or investigation would be necessary.  There is little room in this scenario for 
election official discretion, as there is under the fixed-percentage and adjustable-
percentage audit models. 
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3. MODEL WEAKNESSES 
 
The polling audit model will not necessarily help jurisdictions discover specific errors or 
fraud.  Only when such errors are large and consistent enough to significantly change the 
number of votes received by each candidate will a polling audit alert jurisdictions of such 
problems. 
 
Similarly, when auditors do find discrepancies, this audit will provide little information about 
the source of a discrepancy, since the audit is detached from specific precincts and specific 
machines, and even particular ballot types.  This is especially notable for a number of audit 
goals that use auditing as a feedback mechanism to reform voting systems, procedures, or 
personnel conduct. 
 
Finally, a consequence of the statistical model underlying the polling audit approach is that 
it will probably produce some “false positives.”  The model contemplates that, one percent 
of the time, the hand count of sample paper records and full electronic count will be 
significantly different, despite the fact that there was no error or fraud.  In such cases (in 
particular, where a false positive indicates that the wrong candidate won in the unofficial 
results), jurisdictions may be forced to conduct a full recount, only to find that the paper and 
electronic records match exactly. 
 
4. ADMINISTRATIVE CONSIDERATIONS 
 
TIME AND COST OF AUDIT 
 
It is difficult to compare the costs of polling audits to the costs of fixed-percentage audits.  
While fixed-percentage audit costs increase roughly in proportion to the audit percentage, 
it is not clear how costs vary in the polling audit model.  On one hand, the statistical model 
underlying the polling audit holds that, while the number of ballots that must be sampled 
varies somewhat with the number of ballots cast in an election (holding other things equal, 
particularly the confidence level), this variation is minimal.82  On the other hand, the fact that 
these audits must be conducted in disparate locations may introduce costs that vary 
substantially among jurisdictions.  Additionally, these audits might be conducted by teams of 
poll workers fatigued from working at a polling place for several hours.  A more realistic 
staffing scenario would involve hiring additional poll workers or a specialized force of 
auditors in order to avoid over-burdening polling place staff.  
 
Requiring the audit to occur as soon as possible after an election (see page 27, supra for a 
discussion of why this is particularly important in this audit model) is itself a potential source 
of administrative burden.  Election officials have many responsibilities unrelated to auditing 
after an election, and audits that require their immediate attention and oversight might 
distract them from their other duties. 
 
Another ill-defined cost in polling audits is that of not knowing where error or fraud may 
lie.  Even if a polling audit indicates that there is a discrepancy, it yields little information 
about what the source might be.  Election officials would only know that the hand count 
result of sampled paper records is out of the agreed-upon error bounds.  In contrast to the 
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fixed-percentage audit model, there is no helpful precinct-level or ballot-type-specific 
information.  Polling audits are not useful in deterring attacks on voting systems.  In the 
worst case, the discrepancy would be detected, but not the source.  The only recourse 
election officials have to uncover the source of discrepancies is to conduct a precinct-
specific or full fixed-percentage audit. 
 
5. RECOMMENDATIONS TO IMPROVE THE MODEL 
 
• Develop and Test Paper Record Selection Procedures Well Before an 
Election.  Random selection of paper records is critical to the validity of a polling 
audit.  We recommend the ten-sided dice procedure proposed by Cordero, Wagner 
and Dill, which is easily adapted to this application.83  Rapid completion of the audit 
is equally important, as discussed supra at page 27.  Therefore, a jurisdiction that 
implements a polling audit model should have developed and tested procedures for 
randomly selecting paper records before the audit occurs – the audit logistics are too 
complicated, and time is too short, to allow for experimentation after an election. 
 
• Develop a Plan for Elections Not Confirmed by Polling Audit.  As discussed 
above, a polling audit will provide few clues about whether an unofficial count that 
differs significantly from the audit count is simply a false positive or whether it is the 
result of error or fraud.  Finding a way to distinguish these two situations might be 
an area for further research.  In addition, if election officials conclude that error or 
fraud caused the difference, they must have a plan in place to investigate more 
thoroughly the cause(s).  A means for examining ballots and voting equipment to 
determine whether a certain kind of voting system or ballot type might account for a 
discrepant result is important. 
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III. AUDIT BEST PRACTICES 
 
Our review of the audit procedures and other security measures currently in place in most 
states has led us to conclude that there is a substantial likelihood that such procedures would 
not detect a cleverly designed software-based attack program.  Currently, only fifteen states 
that require voter-verifiable paper records also mandate regular audits of those paper 
records.84  Moreover, even those states that have mandated regular audits have not 
developed the best practices and protocols that are necessary to ensure their effectiveness in 
discovering attacks or failures in the voting systems, or in using audits to improve elections 
in the future.  Below we discuss best practices for conducting audits, regardless of what audit 
model a jurisdiction has chosen, as well as the reasons for instituting such practices: 
 
 
A. PRACTICES FOR SELECTING VOTES TO BE AUDITED 
 
The method and manner employed by a jurisdiction for choosing votes to audit will have a 
tremendous impact on whether the audit itself is administratively burdensome, engenders 
public confidence in election results, detects errors, and provides feedback that will allow 
jurisdictions to improve elections in the future. 
 
 
USE TRANSPARENT AND RANDOM SELECTION PROCESSES FOR ALL 
AUDITING PROCEDURES. 
 
Audits are more likely to prevent fraud and produce greater voter confidence in election 
results if the public can verify that the paper records, machines or precincts to be audited are 
chosen in a truly random manner. As noted in electionline.org’s March 2007 briefing, Auditing 
the Vote, there is “broad agreement among academics, policymakers, computer scientists and 
advocates” on this point.85 
 
The danger of non-transparent and non-random audits is exemplified by a corrupted recount 
in Cuyahoga County, Ohio, which took place following accusations of problems in the 2004 
general election.  The state mandated a hand count of ballots cast in three percent of the 
county’s precincts and a full recount if the three percent audit revealed discrepancies 
between the punch-card and electronic records.  “Seeking to avoid a vast hand-count of 
thousands of punch-card ballots, election workers broke state law by pre-sorting the ballots 
to ensure they matched the final tally.”86  In other words, the audit was rigged to ensure that 
no problems were revealed. 
 
To avoid repeating the problems of Cuyahoga County’s 2004 audit, the selection of precincts 
or machines to be audited must be observable by the public and conducted in a truly random 
manner.  In addition, specific guidelines are needed to ensure that observers will be able to 
actually see each vote counted. 
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In an ideal transparent and random selection process: 
 
• The whole process is publicly observable and ideally videotaped and archived. 
• The random selection is publicly verifiable, i.e., anyone observing is able to verify 
that the sample was chosen randomly. 
• The process is simple and practical within the context of current election practices so 
as to avoid imposing an unnecessary burden on election officials.87 
 
There is today a significant body of literature that addresses ways in which election officials 
can accomplish these goals.  Researchers Arel Cordero, David Wagner and David Dill 
explained how dice could be used to select precincts randomly in The Role of Dice in Election 
Audits.88  In the Machinery of Democracy, the Brennan Center Task Force on Voting System 
Security offered its own suggestions for the random selection of precincts or machines to be 
audited.  Both discussions can be found in Appendix C of this paper.  These methods are 
preferable to using a pseudo-random generator on a computer, which is rarely a transparent 
method for selecting precincts or machines, particularly to observers who do not understand 
technology.  Moreover, as some commentators have noted, because of their opacity, such 
generators are themselves vulnerable to fraud.89 
 
The randomness and transparency of audit selection processes vary in the states that 
currently conduct audits.  In Arizona and Minnesota, precincts and races to be audited are 
selected by lot (at the county seat in Minnesota).90  Other states, such as Colorado, New 
Mexico, Washington, and West Virginia, require jurisdictions to select precincts to audit 
randomly, but the relevant laws and regulations fail to define “randomness” or describe the 
selection processes.91  Parties entitled to appoint poll watchers within the jurisdiction are also 
entitled to appoint representatives to observe the selection of machines for an audit and the 
audit itself.92  In Connecticut, the Secretary of State determines and announces the 
procedures for randomly selecting DREs to audit, and the selection of machines and the 
conduct of the audit may be observed by the public.93  Similarly, in Illinois, the State Board 
of Elections is charged with designing “a standard and scientific random method” to select 
five percent of precincts in each jurisdiction to audit “so that every precinct in the election 
jurisdiction has an equal mathematical chance of being selected.”94  California provides 
public notice of the time and place of the selection of precincts to be audited and of the 
audit itself at least five days before either event is scheduled to occur95 and suggests that 
election officials use “a random number generator or other methods specified in regulations” 
to select precincts to audit.96  In Alaska and Washington, appointed representatives of 
political parties are permitted to observe an audit, but the opportunity to observe the audit 
does not extend to members of the general public.97  Post-election audits in Colorado and in 
Minnesota are publicly observable.98 
 
The time period between the selection of precincts or machines to be audited and the actual 
audit is security-sensitive.  An attacker with the goal of corrupting vote counts could target 
only those that were not chosen for the audit.  Arizona requires jurisdictions to begin post-
election audits within the twenty-four hours after the closing of polls.99  New Mexico 
conducts a post-election audit within five days of county canvasses.100  Election officials 
should minimize this period of time and enforce strict chain-of-custody requirements over 
election materials used in an audit. 
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CONSIDER SELECTING PRECINCTS OR MACHINES FOR AUDITING AT THE 
STATE LEVEL. 
 
Centralized audit selection is more efficient and transparent.  By selecting precincts or 
machines to audit at the state level, counties are relieved of this responsibility and associated 
administrative tasks.  Additionally, audit selection at the state level facilitates the selection of 
precincts to audit in election districts that cross jurisdictional boundaries.  Finally, public 
observers of random selection processes would be able to watch a single selection process, 
rather than attempt to watch multiple county selection processes around a state. 
 
State-level audit selection, however, carries some disadvantages.  Some states may be too 
large – geographically, or in terms of the number of precincts, or both – to select precincts 
in a reasonable amount of time during a single official event.  Selecting precincts or 
machines to audit in a central location might also make it difficult for local election officials 
and voters to observe the selection process for their own jurisdiction.  This could undermine 
the transparency that public audit selection should foster.  Finally, since audit selections 
should occur after all ballot types, including absentee and provisional ballots, have been 
counted, there is a risk that a single jurisdiction with a high proportion of these could hold 
up statewide selection. 
 
 
AUDIT A MINIMUM PERCENTAGE OR NUMBER OF PRECINCTS OR 
MACHINES FOR EACH ELECTION, INCLUDING AT LEAST ONE MACHINE 
MODEL AND/OR PRECINCT IN EACH COUNTY. 
 
Much of the recent academic literature on post-election audits focuses on catching error or 
fraud that could change the outcome of an election.  But finding an error that has changed 
the outcome of an election is in many ways a worst case scenario; most would agree that if 
we are going to find such problems, it would be far better to find (and correct) them in 
landslide elections where they could have no effect on the outcome of an election.  Put 
another way, in most races, a software bug, attack on vote tallies, or other problem that 
affected just two percent of the votes would not alter the outcome of an election.  
Nevertheless most election officials and voters would prefer to find such problems and 
correct them before an audit of an exceptionally close election, rare as they may be.  An audit 
that targets a fixed percentage (e.g., three percent) or minimum number of precincts or 
machines in each race will assist jurisdictions in detecting widely distributed error or fraud, 
regardless of whether such error or fraud was substantial enough to change the outcome of 
the particular election being audited. 
 
Additionally, the inclusion of at least one machine model and/or precinct in each county in 
an audit should help jurisdictions find discrepancies caused by fraud or error limited to a 
particular machine or ballot definition file; ballot designs that caused voters to make 
mistakes; or other problems that might not have been wide-spread enough to change the 
outcome of a race in the election being audited, but could have such a dramatic affect in 
future, closer elections. 
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CONSIDER AUDITING BY MACHINE RATHER THAN BY PRECINCT. 
 
In many states, it will be more efficient to audit by machine or ballot batches, rather than by 
precinct.  Particularly in states that use touch-screen voting machines, jurisdictions will be 
able to achieve the same level of confidence in their results by auditing a smaller percentage 
of machines. 
 
 
FREEZE AND PUBLISH UNOFFICIAL RESULTS BEFORE SELECTING THE 
PRECINCTS OR MACHINES TO BE AUDITED. 
 
Election officials should freeze and publish unofficial election results once all returns are 
received from jurisdictions.  The random selection of precincts or machines to be audited 
should only occur afterwards.  Published results should be broken down by precinct or other 
audit unit (such as voting machine), and further separated into the ballot types that are 
audited (e.g., if absentees are audited separately from polling place votes, then results should 
list absentees separately from polling place tallies).  If the random drawing is conducted too 
soon after the close of polls, election workers processing ballots will know in advance which 
ones will be part of the audit and which will not.  For instance, they might be extra-careful 
when processing ballots from the precincts they know will be audited.  Someone intent on 
committing fraud will be free to do so, knowing that as long as she doesn’t touch the ballots 
that are part of the sample, the audit will have no chance of catching them.  Additionally, 
without the publication of the unofficial results, audit observers cannot verify for themselves 
that the votes were accurately counted.  As a result, election officials supervising the audit 
may be convinced or assured by its findings, but observers would not necessarily feel 
similarly confident about the audit. 
 
 
B. PRACTICES FOR CONDUCTING THE AUDIT 
 
There are specific steps that every jurisdiction can take to make it far more likely that the 
audit as a whole is accurate, useful to election officials, and likely to catch errors that could 
change the outcome of specific races. 
 
 
DON’T JUST MATCH – COUNT! 
(RECORD AND PUBLICLY RELEASE MEANINGFUL DATA ON VOTES CAST). 
 
Audits that record and detail the number of overvotes, undervotes, blank votes, spoiled 
ballots, and, in the case of DREs, cancellations, could be extremely helpful in revealing 
software attacks and software bugs and in identifying problems in ballot design and ballot 
instructions. 
 
Most discussions about post-election audits focus on ensuring that the paper and electronic 
totals of the sampled precincts or machines match.  However, a match between paper and 
electronic records may not reveal the presence of some kinds of problems.  These problems 
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may include some types of outcome-changing software bugs, fraud against a voting system, 
bad ballot design, or machine miscalibration that may have resulted in the 
disenfranchisement of voters. 
 
Jurisdictions may gain significant information about the performance of their voting 
machines and ballot design by reviewing and detailing the number of overvotes, undervotes, 
blank votes, spoiled ballots, and, in the case of DREs, cancellations.  This is information that 
would allow jurisdictions to improve future elections.  This type of election data should be 
tabulated and published, broken down by precinct or machine, and by ballot type (e.g., 
polling place, absentee, or provisional), if possible.  If data on these types of votes deviate 
from normal values, or are distributed in an uneven manner, a jurisdiction can take action to 
correct these problems.  For example, an anomalously high number of overvotes in a polling 
place could indicate that it lacks the appropriate feedback to alert voters to how election 
tabulation equipment is interpreting their ballots.  Similarly, an unusually high number of 
undervotes could point to screen miscalibrations, poor ballot design, poor ballot instructions 
or other problems. 
 
There are several ways in which such a review would be helpful.  First, in the case of DREs, 
a review of cancellations could show that there were problems with both the voter-verifiable 
paper record and the machine.  At least one study has purported to show that the vast 
majority of voters do not thoroughly check their voter-verifiable paper records.101  If a voter 
does not check her paper record, the paper record does not provide extra security for that 
voter.  A vote could be misrecorded on both the paper and electronic record, and both the 
voter and election officials would not realize votes were incorrectly recorded. 
 
However, if even a small percentage of voters (e.g., twenty percent) check their paper 
records thoroughly, the identification of an unusual number of cancellations on the paper 
trail would provide evidence that there was some problem with the mechanism that captures 
voters’ selections on the paper record.102 
 
During the 2000 elections in Lake County, Florida, 376 voters’ selections for Presidential 
candidate were disqualified because approximately two-thirds of them displayed a selection 
of “Gore” from the listed candidates as well as “Gore” in the write-in line.103  Studies have 
shown that some voting populations have high rates of overvotes and undervotes on certain 
types of voting machines.  Low-income and minority voters are especially susceptible to this 
kind of mistake.104  Now, voters using precinct count optical scan voting machines benefit 
from those systems’ protections against over- and undervotes.  If a voter skips a race or 
selects two candidates in a race, the machine informs the voter of the error and allows her to 
correct her ballot so that her intention will be accurately recorded. 
 
A software attack that shut off this protection (or a software “bug” that accidentally shut it 
off) could disproportionately affect certain communities of voters.  In The Machinery of 
Democracy, the Brennan Center demonstrated that a state-wide shutdown of this protection 
could result in the loss of tens of thousands of votes, mostly in low-income and minority 
communities.  A review of the number of over- and undervotes in an audit would provide 
evidence that something went wrong with this protection and allow election officials to 
address it.105 
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High overvote and undervote rates may also indicate that ballots were badly designed and 
caused voter confusion.  By recording these data in audits, election officials and the public 
can gain insight into the effectiveness and usability of various ballot designs. 
For precinct count optical scans, auditing of overvote and undervotes can provide election 
officials with critical information about why some voters’ votes aren’t recorded.  For 
instance, in Minnesota, a post-election audit report drafted by an election integrity group 
revealed that the vast majority of discrepancies between hand counts of the paper ballots and 
the electronic tallies occurred because “the voter used an odd-colored pen, or pressed too 
lightly with a pencil, in which case the vote was misread as an undervote” or “the ballot got 
jammed in the optical scanner.”106  Some votes were recorded as undervotes because voters 
“circled an oval as opposed to filling it in as directed.”107 
 
Having this kind of information should be extremely useful to election officials.  For 
instance, the Minnesota examples discussed above could help election officials determine: 
what kind of voter education to focus on to ensure accurate recording of voter intent is 
maximized; how to improve procedures to ensure that voters are using the right kind of 
pens; and whether there is some problem with the size or thickness of ballots that might 
produce an unusually high number of paper jams. 
 
We are aware of only one state – North Carolina – that has collected and made this type of 
information publicly available, in the hope that it could improve future audits, elections and 
machines.  In reports to the State Board of Election on the May 2006 and November 2006 
elections, the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill’s School of Public Health included 
data that detailed the level of discrepancy between electronic tallies and recounts on each 
type of machine used, and measured the accuracy of voting machines by reviewing their 
relative under and overvote counts.108 
 
 
AUDIT ALL METHODS OF VOTING. 
 
In conducting post-election audits, election officials should not exclude any category of 
votes (e.g., absentee ballots, provisional ballots, damaged ballots).  Audits must be 
comprehensive to ensure that both error and fraud can be readily detected.  Although voters 
cast the majority of ballots on polling place equipment, many jurisdictions increasingly see 
significant numbers of other ballot types, including early, absentee, provisional and 
emergency ballots.  Fifteen states allow “no-excuse” early voting.109  In 2004, more than 
forty percent of all votes cast in Arizona, Nevada, Tennessee, and Texas were received 
during early voting periods.110  Voters in twenty-eight states take advantage of “no-excuse” 
absentee voting by mail.  Oregon conducts all elections with mail-in ballots.111  All but four 
states have provisional balloting at polling places.112  The exclusion of any of these ballot 
types compromises the effectiveness of a post-election audit.  To be comprehensive, all 
ballot types should be included in audit processes.  Ballot types should be sorted and stored 
by precinct, machine, or other unit and randomly selected for auditing. 
 
While the majority of state laws are silent on the inclusion or exclusion of other vote records 
in a post-election audit, several Western states – where a particularly large number of votes 
are cast outside the polling place and/or prior to election dates – are not.  Specifically, 
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California and New Mexico include absentee ballots cast on electronic voting machines in 
their audits.113  In addition to its audit of polling place ballots, Arizona reviews the lesser of 
one percent of the total number of early ballots, or 5,000 early ballots, randomly selected at 
the county level from sequestered batches of early ballots from each machine used to 
tabulate them.114  Provisional, conditional provisional and write-in votes, however, are 
excluded from the audit.115 
 
FIGURE 3. INCLUSION OF OTHER TYPES OF VOTES 
IN POST-ELECTION AUDITS 
 
 
Absentee Ballots
Early Voting Ballots
Provisional Ballots
All Ballot Types
Note: North Carolina includes both absentee ballots and early ballots in an audit.  West Virginia audits absentee ballots and 
provisional ballots. 
Source: ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-602(G) (2007); CAL. ELEC. CODE § 15360(a), (b) (West 2007); Colorado Secretary of State 
Elections Center, Post-Election Random Audit at http://www.elections.colorado.gov/DDefault.aspx?tid=833 (last visited July 27, 
2007) (absentee precincts included although not clearly statutorily required); Telephone Interview with Brad Anderson, Election 
Administrator, Minnesota Secretary of State (July 12, 2007); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 1-14-13.1 (West 2007); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 
163.182.2(b)(1a) (West 2007); E-mail from Paul Miller, Elections Information Manager, Elections Division, Washington Secretary 
of State to Alex Yacoub (July 20, 2007) (on file with the authors);  Telephone Interview with Susan Silverman, Special Assistant, 
Elections Division, West Virginia Secretary of State (July 12, 2007). 
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C. PRACTICES FOR ENSURING OVERALL 
AUDIT EFFECTIVENESS 
 
If the audit is to be effective, there are certain basic policies and practices that jurisdictions 
should have in place.  Among the most important are the following: 
 
 
ENSURE THE PHYSICAL SECURITY OF AUDIT MATERIALS. 
 
Effective auditing of voter-verifiable paper records will serve to deter attacks on voting 
systems and identify problems only if states have implemented solid procedures to ensure 
the physical security of election materials used in a post-election audit, such as records of the 
vote, voting machines, and tally servers.  Sound security measures should include a clear 
chain-of-custody of these materials.  Missing or damaged paper or electronic records will 
make the reconciliation of audits all but impossible. 
 
In The Machinery of Democracy, the Brennan Center examined some of the best chain-of-
custody practices in jurisdictions across the country.  Among the practices cited approvingly 
in the report were: 
 
• Between elections, voting systems for each county are locked in a single room, in a 
county warehouse. 
• The warehouse has perimeter alarms, secure locks, video surveillance and regular 
visits by security guards. 
• Access to the warehouse is controlled by sign-in procedures, possibly with card keys 
or similar automatic logging of entry and exit for regular staff. 
• Some forms of tamper-evident seals are placed on machines before and after each 
election.  Election officials should place seals over all sensitive areas including vote 
data media compartments, communication ports and the seams of the voting system 
case.  
• At the close of polls on Election Day, all audit information (i.e., event logs, voter-
verifiable paper records, paper ballots, machine printouts of vote totals) that is not 
electronically transmitted as part of the unofficial upload to the central election office 
is hand-delivered in official, sealed information packets or boxes.  All seals are 
numbered and tamper-evident. 
• The transportation of information packets is completed by two election officials 
representing opposing parties who have been instructed to remain in joint custody of 
the information packets or boxes from the moment it leaves the precinct to the 
moment it arrives at the county election center. 
• Once the sealed information packets or boxes have reached the county election 
center, they are logged.  Numbers on the seals are checked to ensure that they have 
not been replaced.  Any broken or replaced seals are logged and the reason for 
broken or replaced seals is investigated, where necessary.  Intact seals are left intact. 
• After the packets or boxes have been logged, they are provided with physical security 
precautions at least as great as those listed for voting machines, above.  They should 
be stored in a room with perimeter alarms, secure locks, video surveillance and 
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regular visits by security guards and county police officers; and access to the room is 
controlled by sign-in, possibly with card keys or similar automatic logging of entry 
and exit for regular staff. 
 
All jurisdictions should detail their chain-of-custody practices for their voting system 
software, hardware, and audit records (including paper and electronic) in a document that is 
subject to public review and comment.  Public review and comment would increase 
transparency and accountability for the physical security of audit materials, as members of 
the public would become invested in the process.  The documentation of chain-of-custody 
requirements allows observers to determine when officials deviate from agreed procedures.  
Such a document should explain why these procedures are necessary; this would reduce the 
likelihood of local deviation from the guidelines and ensure that necessary deviations (in the 
case of an unforeseen incident) held to the spirit of the procedures. 
 
States practices to ensure the physical security of election materials used in an audit vary 
greatly.  In Arizona, election officials at the county level maintain custody of ballots and are 
responsible for their security during post-election audits.116  County officials in New Mexico 
are similarly charged with the secure transport and storage of voting machines after an 
election.117  California requires precinct boards to seal and sign containers and packages of 
ballots and other election materials in the presence of members of the public.118  At least two 
members of each precinct board then deliver the sealed containers and packages to election 
officials at central counting centers.119  Colorado and Hawaii specify that voted ballots may 
be handled only in the presence of representatives of different political parties.120  In 
Colorado, the receiving election official is required to provide personnel and facilities to 
preserve and secure election materials.121  Connecticut requires the collection and storage of 
voting machines as soon as possible after the completion of an election.122  Minnesota law 
requires county auditors to securely store sealed envelopes of voted ballots after an 
election.123  In Washington, teams composed of representatives of at least two major political 
parties pick up sealed containers of voted, untallied ballots from polling places to deliver to 
the counting center.124  If ballots are tabulated at the polling place, and if the tallied ballots 
are sealed in a container, only one elections employee is required to transport them to the 
elections department.125 
 
 
IMPLEMENT EFFECTIVE PROCEDURES FOR ADDRESSING EVIDENCE OF 
FRAUD OR ERROR. 
 
If audits are to have a real deterrent effect, jurisdictions must adopt clear procedures for 
addressing audit discrepancies when they are found. Without protocols for responding to 
discrepancies, the detection of fraud will not prevent attacks from succeeding.  
Recommended responses include investigating causes of discrepancies, making corrections 
where necessary, disallowing results if an appropriate remedy cannot be determined, and 
ensuring accountability for discrepancies (by for instance, banning the voting system in 
question from further use until the discrepancy has been explained and/or the system is 
recertified).  Jurisdictions should create discrepancy logs that will be made public, and 
include the results of any investigations undertaken after discrepancies between paper and 
electronic records were discovered. 
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AUDIT THE ENTIRE VOTING SYSTEM, NOT JUST THE MACHINES. 
 
Although this study focuses only on post-election audits of voter-verifiable paper records, 
jurisdictions should conduct audits of the entire voting system to catch errors or fraud in 
other parts of the voting system.  Historically, incorrect vote totals often result from 
aggregation mistakes at central vote tally locations.126  Accordingly, good audit protocols will 
mandate that the entire system – from early and absentee ballots to aggregation at the tally 
server – be audited for accuracy.  Among other procedures, we recommend the following: 
 
• Ensure That Polling Places Compare Vote Tallies and Sign-in Sheets.  At 
close of the polls, vote tallies for each machine should be totaled and compared with 
number of persons that have signed the poll books.  A comparison of these numbers 
should be made publicly available. 
• Ensure Individual Voting Machine and Precinct Totals Are Accurately 
Reflected in Tally Server Calculations.  A copy of totals for each machine should 
be posted at each polling place on election night and taken home by poll workers to 
check against what is posted publicly at election headquarters, on the web, in the 
papers, or elsewhere.  This countermeasure allows poll workers and the public to 
ensure that corrupt or flawed software on a county’s central tally server does not 
incorrectly add up machine vote totals. 
 
Although the adoption of these recommended audit principles may create new financial and 
administrative considerations for election officials – particularly in states that currently do 
not conduct any post-election audits – they are necessary costs to ensuring the integrity of 
election results. The procedures in the few states that currently conduct post-election audits 
would be substantially improved by the adoption of all of these recommendations. 
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IV. DIRECTIONS FOR THE FUTURE 
 
The interest of academics and election integrity experts in post-election audits shows no sign 
of abating.  We offer a few suggestions for further study and approaches that, we hope, will 
add to this research agenda.  
 
 
A. WORK WITH ELECTION OFFICIALS 
 
Our interviews with election officials have left us convinced that many are eager to use the 
information developed by academics and election integrity experts to improve their post-
election audits.  Many ideas discussed in the papers we have reviewed may not be realistic in 
the context of actual elections, given the financial, logistical and political restraints that 
election officials face.  Ultimately, the best way to develop ideas that can help election 
officials improve their post-election audits is to work with them, observing the actual 
conditions under which elections are held. 
 
 
B. NEW AUDIT METHODS 
 
AUDITING BY BALLOT 
 
The statistics associated with auditing prove that auditors can gain higher confidence in their 
audit results with a larger audit sample.  While this report discusses precinct-level, full 
recount audit methods as well as machine-level methods, the highest amount of statistical 
confidence available in our elections would be an audit of individual ballots.  If auditors 
could randomly select a sample of ballots and associate those ballots unequivocally with their 
corresponding electronic records, auditors would need to examine a smaller amount of 
ballots in total to reach a similar level of confidence compared to precinct-level or machine-
level audits.  There are a number of open questions with this style of model.  The mapping 
between paper records and electronic records could compromise ballot secrecy and might be 
illegal in some states.  Also, retrieving individual paper records could be a labor-intensive 
activity. 
 
HISTORY-DEPENDENT AUDIT MODELS 
 
Some statisticians advocate using historical information to inform audits.  For example, in a 
study of recounts commissioned by the State of North Carolina, Kalsbeek & Zhang 
recommend calculating a statistic based on historical levels of discrepancy in the chosen 
precincts.127  Kalsbeek’s method would require a preliminary random selection of at least two 
precincts per jurisdiction and then a supplementary random selection of a number of 
additional precincts based on historical data on the level of discrepancies found in previous 
elections in the precincts chosen in the preliminary selection.  These kinds of audit models 
are interesting, but need more study in order to fully understand what historical data are 
most useful in modifying audits and how these kinds of audit models can be successfully 
incorporated into current election regulations and practices. 
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C. SHARING OF AUDIT INFORMATION 
 
We are hopeful that election officials around the country will begin sharing information with 
each other about how to conduct post-election audits and steps that successfully reduce 
audit discrepancies.  In our interviews with election officials, it was all too often apparent 
that many were struggling with issues that others had already resolved.  Given the 
importance of this issue, and the fact that there appears to be growing acceptance by 
jurisdictions across the country that post-election audits are a necessity, we believe it would 
be particularly helpful if national organizations of election officials such as NASED, NASS 
and NACO began holding meeting and trainings related to post-election audits, where 
election officials could share information with academics, election integrity experts, 
statisticians, auditors and each other.  Researchers have also just begun to study procedural 
issues with conducting manual counts. 
 
 
D. FUTURE RESEARCH  
 
In the course of researching and writing this white paper, we noted a number of topics for 
future research ripe for exploration.  The science of election auditing would be improved 
immensely by research into counting methods and audit procedures as well as research into 
the suitability of election technology to support audits. 
 
MANUAL COUNTING METHODS 
 
There has been very little research to date examining the effectiveness of different methods 
for recounting votes.  The CalTech/MIT Voting Technology Project (VTP) published two 
working papers on the subject of hand-counted ballots in January 2004 and September 2005, 
and North Carolina sponsored a statistical analysis of recount discrepancies in May 2006.  
VTP’s first paper examined the frequency with which recounts confirm results in 
jurisdictions that use optical scan, compared to hand-counted paper ballots in New 
Hampshire.  They found that jurisdictions that used hand-counted paper ballots had a higher 
rate of tabulation error.128 
 
The second VTP paper and the North Carolina study both consisted of statistical analyses of 
discrepancies between machine and hand counts of ballots.129  These analyses found small, 
mostly positive, discrepancies where the magnitude of such discrepancies is larger for hand-
marked voting technologies (e.g., punch-card and optical scan ballots) compared to 
electronic voting machines. 
 
Unfortunately, the specific techniques and procedures associated with the process of 
manually counting votes have not been studied.  There is a widespread belief that humans 
cannot count as well as computers.  However, this criticism depends critically on the 
procedures used in hand counting and whether or not there is significant variation in how 
humans and the vote tabulation equipment judge voter intent.  Given clear procedures for 
what constitutes a valid vote and detailed safeguards and checks during the counting process, 
similar to those used in San Mateo County (see supra at page 16), vote counts will be 
consistently accurate. 
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There is another technical impetus for further study of hand counting processes: a manual 
count that matches the electronic tally does not establish the absence of a discrepancy.  The 
error rate of blind manual counts is independent of any discrepancies between the paper 
records and the electronic tallies.  Thus, if there is a one-vote discrepancy between the paper 
records and the electronic tallies, auditors will face an equal chance of making a mistake that 
cancels the discrepancy and one that turns it into a two-vote discrepancy.  The mistake that 
cancels out the discrepancy is a false agreement (“false negative”) – the recount indicates no 
discrepancy when, in fact, one exists.  One way to guard against false negatives is to conduct 
additional blind recounts whether there is an apparent discrepancy or not.  Additionally, 
increasing the size of a manual counting team from two people to three or more people 
would further protect against false negatives.  The rate at which these false negatives occur is 
unknown and likely depends on the manual counting method employed.  Quantifying the 
likelihood of false negatives, and devising other means to address them, are areas for further 
research. 
 
Election officials need guidance and detailed scientific analyses of manual counting 
procedures.  Members of the NSF ACCURATE center have been working with California 
counties to document and develop robust manual counting procedures, but this work does 
not involve controlled experimentation.  However, there is a need for an experimental 
analysis that compares different methods of manual counting procedures for accuracy, 
efficiency and rates of false negatives. 
 
SUITABILITY OF ELECTION TECHNOLOGY TO SUPPORT AUDITS 
 
Another promising area of research would analyze the effectiveness of currently deployed 
election technologies.  The primary drivers for the design of election technologies cluster 
around ease-of-use, configurability, speed and durability.  Design for voter verification has 
only been incorporated recently and design for auditability currently meets only a very 
narrow notion of auditing. 
 
Currently, voter-verifiable paper records produced by electronic voting machines are difficult 
to handle during a post-election audit.  Most, if not all, currently deployed designs for DRE 
with voter-verifiable paper record printers include a reel-to-reel thermal paper feed for paper 
records that print using a heat-activated pigment on one side of the paper.  Stephen N. 
Goggin and Michael D. Byrne of Rice University discuss in detail the difficulty of using this 
printed paper (which is similar to paper used in cash register receipt printers) in post-election 
audits in a forthcoming article.130  
 
Among other problems, these reels of paper records do not protect ballot secrecy; individual 
records should be cut apart and shuffled.  Additionally, because of the reel-to-reel 
configuration, the individual records curl and don’t stack well, which makes handling them 
during a manual recount cumbersome.  Finally, although voting system vendors claim that 
states can preserve the thermal paper records for the twenty-two month period as required 
by federal law, it is uncertain whether or not this type of paper is sufficiently durable to 
withstand a manual recount of multiple races on a single ballot.  Research into vote counting 
methods using thermal paper and research benchmarking the durability of the different 
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kinds of paper that vendors use would reduce election officials’ uncertainty as to the types of 
auditing activities they can undertake. 
 
The software tools provided by vendors play a key role in election auditing.  Election 
databases need to maintain the integrity of the ballots they store and they must also produce 
reports and output suitable for supporting audits.  For example, to do a machine-based 
audit, auditors would need machine-level results that include aggregate numbers of ballots 
cast per machine and contest.  Each vendors’ election database product produces some type 
of aggregate vote tally output, but not all produce per-machine or per-precinct results 
separated by each type of ballot (e.g., absentee, early, provisional, regular, etc.).  Also, some 
vendors’ products do not provide electronic output in formats that can be provided to 
citizen’s groups for analysis and oversight.  Research that catalogs what auditing support 
each vendor’s product provides, what auditors need and what types of capabilities should be 
standard would eliminate a growing need felt by election officials and potentially eliminate 
risky ad hoc practices election officials use to cope with current deficiencies. 
 
USING TECHNOLOGY TO AUTOMATE POST-ELECTION AUDITS 
 
A forthcoming paper by Joseph A. Calandrino, J. Alex Halderman and Edward W. Felten of 
Princeton University looks at how jurisdictions could use recounting machines to conduct 
most of the work of auditing, reducing the time and money associated with auditing.  The 
authors state that the output of the recounting machines could be “manually audited,” and 
that their proposal would “achieve equal or greater confidence than precinct-based auditing 
at a significantly lower cost while protecting voter privacy better than previous ballot-based 
auditing methods.131  Certainly, the time, labor and financial savings promised by this and 
similar proposals make the subject of partial automation of post-election audits worthy of 
further exploration. 
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GLOSSARY132 
 
Acceptance Testing: Acceptance testing refers to the examinations done by a jurisdiction 
when it purchases equipment from a vendor before delivery is accepted.  It is done only 
once in the history of the equipment, not on a per-election basis.  The testing typically 
consists of a demonstration of basic functionality, such as confirming that the systems boot 
properly, that they have the proper software versions installed, and that the mechanics (e.g., 
printers) are in nominal working order.133 
 
Cancellation: This term applies only to DRE voting machines that produce a voter-
verifiable paper record.  If a voter discovers an error on her paper record, she may cancel the 
erroneous ballot and cast a new ballot.  A cancelled or “voided” record refers to the 
cancelled, erroneous ballot or vote.  The cancellation will be documented on the voter-
verifiable paper record and may be observed and counted by those conducting audit or 
recounts of the paper record. 
 
Chain of Custody: The documented order in which election equipment and materials are 
handled by identified election personnel, including truck drivers and poll workers, as well as 
officials. Specifically, there should be an unbroken trail of accountability that ensures the 
physical security of election equipment and materials. 
 
Confidence Level:  As referenced in the paper, “confidence level” is the probability 
(expressed between 0% and 100%) of finding at least one electronically miscounted set of 
votes (whether they are audited by machine, precinct, or other unit), when there are assumed 
to be enough such miscounted votes to change the result of the audited election.  This is not 
“confidence level” as used in hypothesis testing for statistical significance.  In Percentage-Based 
Versus S.A.F.E. Vote Tabulation Auditing: A Graphic Comparison, written by John McCarthy et 
al., this concept is referred to as “statistical power,” and its mathematical basis and benefits 
are discussed in detail.134 
 
DRE (Direct Recording Electronic Voting Machine): A Direct Recording Electronic 
(DRE) voting machine directly records the voter’s selections in each race or contest.  It does 
so via a ballot that appears on an electronic display screen.  Typical DRE machines have flat 
panel display screens with touch screen input, although other technologies have been used 
(including paper and push button displays).  The defining characteristic of these machines is 
that votes are captured and stored electronically.  Some DREs can be equipped with printers 
capable of printing voter-verifiable paper records. 
 
Electronic Tally: The electronic count of votes recorded on individual voting machines, 
possibly aggregated by precinct or polling place. 
 
Logic and Accuracy Testing: Logic and Accuracy Testing is generally conducted prior to 
the opening of polls and often after the closing as well.  It tests the configuration of election 
definitions on vote tabulation devices to ensure that the content correctly reflects the 
election being held (i.e., contests, candidates, number to be elected, ballot formats, etc.), that 
all voting positions can be voted for the maximum number of eligible candidates, and that 
results are accurately tabulated and reported. 
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Overvote: An overvote occurs when a voter makes more selections than she is entitled to 
make.  For example, voting for four candidates when the voter is entitled to vote for only 
three out of seven candidates is an overvote. 
 
Parallel Testing: Parallel Testing, also known as Election Day testing, involves selecting 
voting machines at random and testing them as realistically as possible during the period that 
votes are being cast.  The fundamental question addressed by such tests arises from the fact 
that pre-election testing is almost always done using a special test mode in the voting system, 
and corrupt software could potentially arrange to perform honestly while in test mode while 
performing dishonestly during a real election.  Parallel Testing is particularly valuable to 
address some of the security questions that have been raised about DREs, but it is 
potentially applicable to all electronic vote-counting systems.135 
 
PCOS (Precinct Count Optical Scan): These machines allow voters to mark paper ballots, 
typically with pencils or pens.  Voters then carry their ballots (sleeved or otherwise protected 
so that others cannot see their ballot selections) to a scanner.  At the scanner, they un-sleeve 
the ballot and insert it into the scanner, which detects the voters’ marks with an optical 
scanning element and records the votes electronically.  The paper ballots are preserved for 
audits and recounts. 
 
Spoiled Ballot: A spoiled ballot will not count in an election.  It is a ballot (optical scan, 
absentee, or provisional) that a voter returns to election officials to cancel after she has made 
an error.  The concepts of “cancellation” and “spoiled ballot” are often linked, in that 
statutory limits on the number of ballots a voter may spoil are sometimes interpreted as 
applying to the number of cancellations a voter can make on a DRE. 
 
Tamper-Evident Seal: Tamper-evident seals are devices used to signal when election 
equipment or supplies have been improperly handled.  They can be as simple as serial-
numbered adhesive seals that change color dramatically when disturbed, to serial-numbered 
strong plastic loop enclosures that cannot be removed without tools.  Election equipment 
and storage containers of ballots and other election materials should be sealed against 
improper opening.  If election equipment or storage containers of election materials have 
been improperly opened, the seal should show visible signs that such tampering occurred.  
Jurisdictions should log the removal or disturbance of seals in their chain-of-custody 
records. 
 
Undervote: An undervote occurs when a voter makes fewer selections than she is entitled to 
make.  For example, voting for only two candidates when the voter is entitled to vote for 
three out of seven candidates is an undervote. 
 
Voter-Verifiable Paper Record: Voter-verifiable paper records are the paper records or 
paper trails produced by DRE voting machines that show a voter her selections.  She may 
use the paper record to verify that the machine correctly recorded her selections before 
casting her ballot.  In some states the voter-verifiable paper record is the legal ballot in a 
recount situation (e.g., California), taking precedence over electronic counts.
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APPENDIX A: REPORTED INACCURATE ELECTRONIC 
VOTE TALLIES AND MACHINE OUTPUT ERRORS CAUSED 
BY SOFTWARE BUGS, PROGRAMMING MISTAKES, 
AND OTHER FAILURES* 
Compiled by Common Cause and VotersUnite! 
* Updated on August 3, 2007. 
 
Date Machine 
Type 
State Location/Description 
November 
2002 
ES&S: 
Optech 3P 
Eagle 
Alabama Baldwin County, AL: 
An error in the way officials downloaded vote data from a 
computer cartridge led to an incorrect initial tally of votes in 
the gubernatorial election.  The initial tally of the votes 
showed that the Democratic incumbent had received 19,070 
votes in Baldwin County.  A reexamination of the vote 
tallies showed that the incumbent received only 12,736 
votes, which gave the victory to his Republican challenger.  
The machine in use was an optical scan machine.  The 
incumbent initially called for a recount of all counties and 
questioned the legitimacy of the election until he finally 
conceded two weeks later.1 
November 
2006 
ES&S: 
Optech 3P 
Eagle 
Alabama Baldwin County, AL: 
A voting machine programming error was discovered after 
the general election.  The electronic machine had labeled an 
unopposed Republican County Commissioner as a 
Democrat.  The error only occurred when voters attempted 
to cast straight-ticket Republican ballots.  Although the 
election outcome was not affected, since the candidate ran 
unopposed, the error remained undetected until Election 
Day had passed, and the candidate received an uncommonly 
low number of votes.2 
September 
2004 
ES&S: 
Optech IV-C 
Arizona Maricopa County, AZ: 
The original totals in the Republican primary for State 
House in District 20 showed that one candidate led his 
closest competitor by only four votes.  The small margin led 
election officials to conduct a recount.3  The optical scan 
recount found nearly 500 additional votes for the five 
candidates in the race, and the initial second place candidate 
won the election by 13 votes.4 
November 
2004 
ES&S: 
M115 
Arkansas Carroll County, AR: 
An incorrectly programmed chip from an optical scan 
system skewed results from the race for Justice of the Peace 
in District 2.  Election officials fortunately discovered the 
glitch when they met to certify the elections.  As a result, the 
ballots were recounted.5 
Date Machine 
Type 
State Location/Description 
May 2004 ES&S: 
M150 
Arkansas Craighead County, AR: 
The initial results of a constable race in District 13 showed 
that one candidate received all 158 votes cast in Precinct 20.  
When the opponent questioned the results of the elections, 
the machine was inspected and an error was found in a 
computer chip’s code.  A recount showed that both 
candidates received votes, though the outcome of the 
election was unchanged.6
May 2004 ES&S: 
M150 
Arkansas Fulton County, AR: 
A malfunction in a ballot scanner caused county election 
officials to recount ballots for the primary election by hand.  
County officials blamed the machine manufacturer for 
incorrectly programming the machine.  The company 
blamed the county officials for not sending all of the sample 
ballots needed for the company to program the machines 
accurately.7
November 
2006 
ES&S: 
iVotronic 
Arkansas Cleburne County, AR: 
During early voting, some voters reported that the mayoral 
candidate they selected was switched when they saw their 
vote on the review screen.  The problem was confirmed by 
the county clerk.  The vote-switching was blamed on a 
calibration error and was not caught until 252 votes had 
been cast on the questionable voting equipment.8
November 
2006 
ES&S: 
iVotronic 
Arkansas 
 
Washington County, AR: 
The voter-verifiable paper record printed the incorrect 
voting district numbers for each state representative 
candidate.  A candidate caught the error as he tried to cast 
his own ballot.  ES&S re-programmed the machines and the 
county election coordinator insisted that the error “never 
affected the tallying of votes,” just the district listed on the 
audit trail.9
August 
2004 
Sequoia: 
Edge 
California Sacramento, CA: 
While Sequoia demonstrated their voting machines to the 
state officials, its touch-screen machine outfitted with a 
paper trail failed to report votes on Spanish language ballots.  
“The paper trail itself seemed to work fine but what it 
revealed was when [the Sequoia representative] 
demonstrated voting in Spanish, the machine itself did not 
record his vote,”  Darren Chesin, staff director for the 
Senate Elections and Reapportionment Committee, 
explained.  “Programming errors can occur and the paper 
trail was the way we caught it.”10  
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Date Machine 
Type 
State Location/Description 
March 
2004 
Diebold: 
AccuVote-OS 
California San Diego, CA: 
Weeks after election day, local officials discovered an optical 
scan error.  Eight Diebold scanners had been used on 
208,446 absentee ballots.  Votes were miscounted in both 
the Democratic presidential primary race and the primary 
race for the Republican U.S. Senate seat.11  A recount was 
conducted, revealing that “2,821 absentee ballots cast for 
Democratic presidential hopeful John Kerry were actually 
counted for Dick Gephardt.”  Similarly, in the Senate race, 
68 votes for one candidate and six votes for another were 
credited to a third candidate.  Apparently, the error was 
caused by multiple scanners feeding data into the tabulation 
system at once.12
November 
2005 
Diebold: 
AccuVote-OS 
Colorado Pitkin County, CO: 
Almost 1,200 phantom votes were reported in one precinct.  
Election officials initially announced that 1,560 people voted 
in Precinct 5, but later official results showed that 374 
people had voted in that precinct.  Apparently, the mistake 
was not caused by an electronic machine error, but instead 
by faulty spreadsheet formulas used to tally votes from each 
precinct.13
November 
2006 
Sequoia: 
Insight 400 C 
Colorado Denver, CO: 
In an election for several local offices, vote counting took 
nearly a week because 70,000 absentee ballots had been 
mailed out with barcode misprints.  The Sequoia scanners 
could not sort ballots correctly by district, so election 
officials had to do so by hand.  Additionally, election 
officials reported that many voters had used incorrect ink 
pens or marked their ballots in a manner that made it 
unlikely that the scanners could record their votes.  As a 
result, at least 5% of absentee ballots had to be transcribed 
onto unused ballots by poll workers in order to be 
scanned.14
November 
2002 
ES&S: 
iVotronic 
Florida Broward County, FL: 
A software error caused 103,222 votes, cast with ES&S 
iVotronic paperless machines, to be left uncounted in the 
original tally.  The error was discovered the morning after 
Election Day.  When the missing votes were added, voter 
turnout for the county was adjusted from 35% to 45%.15
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Date Machine 
Type 
State Location/Description 
November 
2004 
ES&S: 
M650 
Florida Broward County, FL: 
A programming error in an optical scan tabulator would 
have changed the outcome of a ballot measure, had it not 
been caught by alert election officials.  The optical scan 
tabulator was used to count absentee ballots.  The glitch 
occurred because the machines in use were programmed to 
accept only 32,000 votes per discrete ballot item, but there 
were more than twice that number of votes cast on the 
measure.  Once the machines were reprogrammed to allow 
for counting of all of the votes, the measure received more 
than 64,000 “yes” votes and it passed. The measure gave the 
counties permission to seek voter approval for slot 
machines at several local venues.16
October 
2006 
ES&S: 
iVotronic; 
M650 
Florida Broward County, FL: 
During early voting, there were numerous reports of votes 
cast for the Democratic gubernatorial candidate that were 
given to his Republican opponent.  A spokeswoman for the 
Supervisor of Elections said that the machines likely needed 
to be recalibrated and that poll workers were available to fix 
the machines.17
April 2002 ES&S: 
iVotronic; 
M650 
Unity 
Election 
Reporting 
Management 
System used 
to combine 
totals 
Florida Miami-Dade County, FL: 
In Medley, the vote tallies for two city council races were 
miscounted when the results of the absentee votes from 
optical scan machines were combined with the results of the 
electronic ballots.  The initial count showed victories for 
two candidates who had actually lost the election.  The 
Miami-Dade elections supervisor said that all software had 
been tested before the election without a hitch, but poll 
workers noticed the problem as they fed results into the 
computers.  Evidently, a technician from the voting machine 
manufacturer inadvertently bumped the first candidate to 
the last position when he opened the ballot program on the 
memory cards to change the heading of the ballot.  When 
the results of the two systems were combined, they didn’t 
match properly.18
November 
2006 
Sequoia: 
AVC Edge 
Florida Palm Beach County, FL: 
Voters reported that vote-switching had occurred as they 
cast their ballots in the 2006 House race.  Additionally, 
others experienced problems when the wrong ballots 
appeared on their touch screens while voting.19
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Date Machine 
Type 
State Location/Description 
November 
2006 
ES&S: 
iVotronic  
Florida Sarasota County, FL: 
There were over 18,000 undervotes in the 13th 
Congressional race between Vern Buchanan (R) and 
Christine Jennings (D).20  Buchanan defeated Democrat 
Christine Jennings by a slim 369 vote margin.21  There were 
numerous complaints that the 13th Congressional District 
race was not appearing or recording properly.  Some voters 
reported that votes for Christine Jennings failed to appear 
on the review screens at several polling locations.22
September 
2002 
ES&S: 
M100 
Florida Union County, FL: 
In Union County, Florida, a programming error caused 
machines to read 2,642 Democratic and Republican votes as 
entirely Republican in the September 2002 election.  The 
vendor, ES&S, accepted responsibility for the programming 
error and paid for a hand recount.23
November 
2006 
Diebold: 
TS-R6; TS-
RS 
Georgia DeKalb, Fulton, and Cobb Counties, GA: 
Touch-screen voting machines switched votes for 
Democratic candidates to Republicans.  Technicians were 
dispatched to recalibrate machines.  The vote-switching 
problems significantly slowed down the voting process for 
those who went to the polls.  By mid afternoon, at least 30-
40 voters reported experiencing the vote-switching 
problem.24
September 
2004 
Hart: 
eSlate 3000 
Hawaii Honolulu, HI: 
Voting machines gave voters the option of selecting a Green 
Party ballot, although there were no Green Party candidates.  
As a result, 22 voters wasted their votes and were essentially 
disenfranchised.25
November 
2006 
ES&S: 
M550  
Idaho Bannock County, ID: 
Although county election officials were directed by ES&S to 
use Bic pens to mark ballots, the scanners failed to 
recognize the ink.  Once the uncounted ballots were 
identified, poll workers marked each ballot with ink that 
would be recognized by the scanner and fed them into the 
machine for a second time.26
October 
2006 
Sequoia: 
AVC Edge II 
Pl 
Illinois Chicago and Cook County, IL: 
Trouble reports filed by voters and poll workers during early 
voting detailed some calibration issues with the touch 
screens.  According to the Chicago Tribune, Chicago and 
Cook County officials said they had received a few 
complaints from early voters about pressing once candidate 
name on the touch screen and having the machine register 
another.  This type of event can occur if the machine is not 
adequately calibrated.27
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Date Machine 
Type 
State Location/Description 
April 2003 ES&S: 
M100 
Illinois Lake County, IL: 
Because of a programming error that failed to account for 
the option of “no candidate” on the ballot, election results 
were placed next to the names of the wrong candidates in 
four different races.  The problem was corrected by 10pm 
on the evening of Election Day.28
November 
2004 
Fidlar: 
AccuVote 
2000 ES 
Indiana Franklin County, IN: 
A glitch caused optical scanners to count Democratic 
straight-line votes as Libertarian votes.  After the error was 
found, the recount changed the results of the county 
commissioner’s race in favor of the Democratic candidate.  
The glitch was suspected when a Libertarian congressional 
candidate was receiving four times the vote in Franklin 
County than in the rest of the district.  The voting machine 
manufacturers called the glitch an “isolated incident.”29
November 
2004 
ES&S: 
Microvote 
Infinity 
Indiana LaPorte County, IN: 
Electronic voting machines reported that each precinct had 
exactly 300 registered voters.  Election officials did not 
notice the error until 7:00pm on election night.  If there had 
actually been 300 voters in each precinct, there would have 
been 22,200 in LaPorte County as a whole.  In fact, there 
were more than 79,000 registered voters in the county.30  
Reports were unclear as to whether votes were lost as a 
result. 
November 
2006 
ES&S: 
iVotronic 
Indiana Marion County, IN: 
When the polls closed at 6:00pm on Election Day, workers 
were unable to retrieve votes from the 520 touch-screen 
machines used by disabled voters.  The problem occurred 
because ES&S had programmed the machines for 
Pennsylvania's polling hours, which stayed open until 
8:00pm.  Disabled voters were concerned that their votes 
would not be counted.  In fact, when the incident was 
reported three days after the election, those same votes had 
not yet been recovered or counted.31
June 2006 ES&S: 
M100 
Iowa Pottawattamie County, IA: 
A ballot programming error caused the new optical scan 
system to tabulate votes incorrectly.  When absentee ballots 
were tabulated for a county recorder’s race in the 
Republican primary, results showed one candidate, a 
University of Nebraska at Omaha student, had 99 votes, 
while his opponent, the county recorder since 1983, had 
only 79.  The surprising outcome led to a recount of 
absentee ballots, revealing that the incumbent actually 
received 153 votes while his challenger received 25.32
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Type 
State Location/Description 
November 
2004 
ES&S: 
Optech III 
Iowa Scott County, IA: 
Optical scan machines malfunctioned when tabulating 
absentee ballots.  As a result, poll workers had to manually 
feed about 23,000 ballots one by one.33
August 
2002 
ES&S: 
Optical Scan 
(model 
unknown) 
Kansas Clay County, KS: 
A computer glitch in an optical scan voting system showed 
that a challenger in a primary race for county commissioner 
had won, but a hand recount showed that the incumbent 
commissioner won by a landslide: 540 votes to 175. The 
computer had mistakenly reversed the totals for the 
candidates in one ward.34
November 
2006 
Hart: 
eSlate 
Kentucky Calloway County, KY: 
Vote-switching appeared to have occurred on the review 
screens of Hart InterCivic eSlate machines.  Straight-ticket 
Democratic votes were switched to Republican straight-
ticket votes in all contested races.35
November 
2006 
ES&S: 
3P Eagle 
Maine Waterville, ME: 
Unidentified machine malfunctions caused election results 
to indicate that one Senate candidate for District 25 received 
27,000 votes on one of the three machines used by the 
town.  27,000 is about 16,000 more votes than the number 
of registered voters in the whole city.36
May 2006 Diebold: 
AV-OS 
Michigan Barry County, MI: 
Flawed ballot programming caused an optical scan system to 
tally votes incorrectly.  The problem was discovered when a 
county clerk received the voting results from the precinct 
where he had voted and saw that one candidate received no 
votes, despite the fact that he voted for the candidate 
himself.  He also thought it peculiar that 90 out of 127 votes 
cast in one precinct selected the option to write in a 
candidate on the ballot.  Because there were widespread 
problems with machines incorrectly tallying votes, county 
workers hand counted votes for the school board election.37
August 
2004 
Sequoia: 
Optech III-P 
Eagle 
Michigan Muskegon, MI: 
In the race for Township Clerk, Optech scan machines 
failed to detect 2% of votes.  Initially, the machines 
indicated that the incumbent had been defeated by a five 
vote margin.  After a recount, 39 additional votes were 
factored into election totals and the challenger won by two 
votes.38
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May 
2005 
ES&S: 
Optical Scan 
(model 
unknown) 
Mississippi Forrest County, MS: 
The primary election for a city council race was not certified 
for days after the election because of discrepancies in vote 
tallies.  The number of ballots counted by optical scanners 
reportedly did not correspond to the vote totals on the 
voting machines.39
May 2006 ES&S: 
M150, M550 
Montana Yellowstone County, MT: 
A programming error caused voting machines to 
inaccurately record all votes.  An election official explained 
that he suspected the problem had occurred because he 
forgot to hit the “zero out” button required between 
entering absentee and regular ballots on the machine.  
Consequently, as many as 3,000 absentee ballots may have 
been counted a second time when the regular ballots were 
being run through the machines.  Officials decided to 
conduct a full recount to ensure that the election outcome 
was accurate.40
November 
2004 
ES&S: 
M550 
Nebraska 
 
Lancaster County, NE: 
During the general election optical scan machines 
experienced a number of malfunctions.  Some shut down 
completely.  When the problems began, election officials 
stopped to test the six machines, revealing that two were not 
producing correct vote tallies.  Those two machines were 
shut down, but later in the day, the remaining machines 
began to have similar mechanical problems.41
November 
2002 
ES&S: 
M100 
Nebraska Sarpy County, NE: 
The optical scan machines failed to tally “yes” votes on the 
Gretna school-bond issue, giving the false impression that 
the measure was defeated.  The measure had actually passed 
by a 2-1 margin.42
November 
2004 
ES&S: 
M650 
Nebraska Sarpy County, NE: 
After ballots were counted in a race for city council, election 
officials realized that there were more votes than voters.  
According to the officials, the error affected 32 of 80 
precincts and as many as 10,000 votes.  It was believed that 
the glitch affected the candidates equally and did not alter 
the outcome of the elections.  The evidence and explanation 
for the miscount were inconclusive.43
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November 
2006 
Sequoia: 
AVC 
Advantage 
New Jersey Passaic, Paterson, Scotch Plains, and North Bergen 
Counties, NJ: 
The US Attorney for New Jersey dispatched investigators to 
address complaints of voting machines that were preventing 
voters from casting ballots for the Republican Senate 
candidate.  Some reported that their ballot was pre-voted in 
favor of the Democratic incumbent, while others said the 
machine would not register their selections.44
November 
2002 
 
Sequoia: 
Edge 
New Mexico Bernalillo County, NM: 
After Election Day, local officials discovered that about 
12,000 early votes remained uncounted.  Reportedly, the 
error was confined to early voting machines, on which 
approximately 48,000 people cast their ballots.  Apparently, 
vote total changes did not alter the outcome of the race.45
November 
2004 
 
Sequoia: 
Edge; AVC 
Advantage 
ES&S: 
iVotronic 
Danaher: 
Shouptronic 
New Mexico Bernalillo County and other counties, NM: 
Throughout the state of New Mexico, significantly high 
phantom vote rates and undervote rates led voting analysts 
to question the outcome of the elections in New Mexico.  
New Mexico led the nation in the highest undervote rates.  
Also, certified results showed a remarkably high number of 
phantom votes.46
November 
2004 
Sequoia: 
AVC 
Advantage 
North 
Carolina 
Buncombe County, NC: 
Touch-screen voting machines in at least two precincts did 
not display one of the races on the ballot.  One election 
official estimated that the error affected at least 600 voters.  
Because there was no paper record, it was impossible to 
determine how many votes were lost.47
November 
2004 
Unilect: 
Patriot 
North 
Carolina 
Carteret County, NC: 
In the election for state agricultural commissioner, about 
4,400 votes were lost.  On election night, 3.3 million ballots 
were cast and the Republican candidate led his Democratic 
opponent by 2,287 votes.  The touch-screen DREs that had 
caused the problems did not have a backup system, making 
the lost votes irrecoverable.  With almost twice as many 
votes permanently erased as were needed to win the 
election, a contentious legal battle ensued that only ended 
three months later when the contesting candidate decided to 
concede the election.48
November 
2002 
ES&S: 
Optech 3P 
North 
Carolina 
Chatham County, NC: 
A machine programming error caused all straight-ticket 
Republican votes to go to the Libertarian candidate in N.C. 
House District 54.49
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September 
2002 
ES&S: 
M100 
North 
Carolina 
Robeson County, NC: 
During a Senate primary, ballot-tabulating machines 
malfunctioned in 31 of 41 precincts.  Local election officials 
stated that it was due to a software glitch related to faulty 
memory card programming and recounted the ballots.50
November 
2002 
ES&S: 
Optech 3P 
Eagle 
North 
Carolina 
Wayne County, NC: 
A programming error caused machines to skip several 
thousand party-line votes, both Republican and Democrat.  
Correcting the error turned up 5,500 more votes and 
reversed the outcome of the race for State House District 
11.51
November 
2004? 
ES&S: 
iVotronic 
Ohio Mahoning County, OH: 
Sixteen of the 312 precincts experienced problems with 
voting machines on Election Day, resulting in delays when 
tabulating the results.  The problems were attributed to a 
number of issues, including machine malfunctions, 
problems with cartridges, and human error.52
November 
2004 
ES&S: 
M550 
Ohio Sandusky County, OH: 
An election turnout of 131% in one town indicated a 
tabulation error.  Officials concluded that some ballots, in 
nine precincts, had been counted twice.  They speculated 
that some ballots had been fed through the machine more 
than once.53
November 
2006 
ES&S: 
iVotronic 
Pennsylvania Allegheny County, PA: 
Twenty voting machines were removed from polling 
stations across Allegheny County due to technical glitches.  
The faulty machines failed to “zero out,” or reset the vote 
tally at zero before the voting started.54
July 2005 Danaher: 
1242 
Pennsylvania Berks County, PA: 
During the primaries for county election board, 111 votes 
were lost.  The error occurred when the cartridges used to 
record votes were accidentally programmed as training 
cartridges.  Election results showed that three races were 
determined by less than 111 votes.55
May 2005 ES&S: 
M550 
Pennsylvania Cumberland County, PA: 
A ballot programming error for straight-line ticket votes 
gave the office of magisterial district judge to the wrong 
candidate.  Straight-ticket Democratic votes were given to 
the Republican candidate.  Straight-ticket Republican votes 
were not counted at all.  Initial vote totals showed the 
Republican candidate had won by a 1,650 to 1,468 margin.  
Ultimately, however, the Democratic candidate won by a 
two-vote margin – 1,703 to 1,701 – in the recount.56
POST-ELECTION AUDITS: RESTORING TRUST IN ELECTIONS 55
Date Machine 
Type 
State Location/Description 
May 2006 ES&S: 
Optical Scan 
(model 
unknown) 
Pennsylvania Luzerne County, PA: 
Unofficial tallies differed by nearly 6,000 votes from official 
ballot counts. Some candidates’ vote totals were hundreds 
of votes short of the initial count.  The tabulation errors 
were attributed to the voting machine vender, who failed to 
reset a counter on a ballot scanner.57
November 
2006 
ES&S: 
iVotronic 
South 
Carolina 
Charleston County, SC: 
iVotronic machines failed to allow voters to review their 
choices in contests in which they voted for more than one 
candidate.  “If voters can vote for only one candidate, the 
review screen shows who they voted for, but if they can 
vote for two or more candidates, as is the case in a 
Charleston County School Board race and the Charleston 
County Soil and Water Commission race, then the review 
screen indicates only whether they have voted for the 
maximum number allowed.  It does not state for whom they 
voted.”58
November 
2005 
ES&S: 
iVotronic 
South 
Carolina 
Kershaw County, SC: 
Initial vote totals in the Republican and Democratic primary 
races for a County Council seat, showed that 3,208 votes 
had been cast in District 2.  A manual count discovered that 
only 768 votes had been cast.  Election officials suspected 
that the error had occurred because machine cartridges were 
incorrectly programmed to record some votes more than 
once.  A state election official apparently did not check a 
box that would have prevented multiple readings.59
October 
2006 
ES&S: 
iVotronic; 
M650 
Texas Bexar County, TX: 
The tabulation of election results was delayed for one and a 
half hours.  The tabulation computers had not been 
programmed with updated data in order to count “mail-in” 
paper ballots.  The computer system was taken off-line and 
updated with the information needed to process the 3,000 
paper ballots, which were then tabulated using high-speed 
scanners.60
November 
2006 
Diebold: 
TS-R6 
Texas El Paso County, TX: 
El Paso County Attorney Jose Rodriguez said that 16 people 
complained that a vote cast on their touch-screen ballot 
registered to the wrong candidate.  Five of the people called 
Rodriguez’ office to complain.  Eleven others called a local 
radio show to complain.61
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November 
2006 
ES&S: 
iVotronic 
Texas Hidalgo County, TX: 
Election officials had to recount votes for U.S. House 
District 28 manually after discovering that the device used 
to download election totals from its touch-screen machine 
malfunctioned.  “The director of elections for the Texas 
Secretary of State's office, Ann McGeehan, said votes would 
be counted using a printout generated by each voting 
machine.”62
October 
2006 
ES&S: 
iVotronic 
Texas Jefferson County, TX: 
During early voting, voters complained that when they 
selected a particular candidate, another candidate’s name 
would light up.  KDFM reported that the vote switching 
occurred with voters who had cast a straight Democratic 
ticket as well as individual votes.63
March 
2004 
ES&S: 
M315 
Texas Lubbock County, TX: 
Machines failed to count votes in the race for Precinct 8 
Democratic chairman.  The ballots had to be recounted with 
alternate software, provided by ES&S.64
November 
2002 
ES&S: 
M650 
Texas Scurry County, TX: 
An unanticipated landslide victory for two Republican 
commissioner candidates caused poll workers to question 
the results.  A chip in the ES&S M-650 contained an 
incorrect ballot program.  After ES&S sent a new chip and 
the county officials counted the votes by hand, the opposing 
Democratic candidates actually won by a large margin.65
March 
2006 
Hart: 
eSlate; eScan 
Texas Tarrant County, TX: 
During the primaries in Tarrant County, TX, a 
programming error caused an extra 100,000 votes to be 
recorded than had been cast.  Initial tallies indicated that 
158,000 people had voted when actually only approximately 
58,000 had voted.  The problems stemmed from a 
programming error created by the vendor, Hart InterCivic.  
The error caused the computer to compound vote totals 
each time the election totals were updated throughout the 
night, rather than simply keeping a running total.  According 
to news accounts, John Covell, a vice president with Hart 
stated, “The system did what we told it to do.  We told it 
incorrectly.”  The program was designed specifically for 
Tarrant County, and no other counties reported similar 
problems, elections officials said.66
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Date Machine 
Type 
State Location/Description 
October 
2004 
Hart: 
eSlate 
Texas Travis County, TX: 
Voters complained that their votes had been changed for 
the Presidential race.  Voters who cast a straight-party 
Democratic ticket reported that after a final review of their 
ballot that the presidential selection had been shifted from 
Kerry/Edwards to Bush/Cheney.  Travis County election 
officials tested the voting system and could not replicate the 
errors.  Gail Fisher, manager of the county’s Elections 
Division, theorized that after selecting their straight party 
vote, some voters went to the next page of the electronic 
ballot and pressed “enter” perhaps thinking they were 
pressing “cast ballot” or “next page.”  Since the 
Bush/Cheney ticket was the first item on the next page, the 
voters were accidentally reselecting a new presidential 
team.67
November 
2003 
AVS: 
WinVote 
Virginia Fairfax County, VA: 
Voters complained that the machines were failing to register 
their votes for incumbent school board member Rita S. 
Thompson (R).  Local election officials reported that testing 
later indicated that for every 100 votes cast for Thompson, 
the machines subtracted approximately one vote for her.  
According to voters, the machine would initially display an 
“x” aside Thompson’s name, but the “x” would disappear 
seconds later.  One voter said it took him about 4 or 5 
attempts before he successfully voted for Thompson.  It 
was impossible to determine whether lost votes were 
intended for Thompson or whether other candidates also 
lost votes.68
November 
2006 
AVS: 
WinVote 
Virginia Fairfax, VA: 
Reports indicated that if voters touched the screen around 
the U.S. Senate box, the wrong candidate would light up.  
Election officers told voters to make sure to use their 
fingertips and to notify them of any malfunctions they 
encountered.  Fairfax’s general registrar called the WinVote 
manufacturer to report the glitch and was told it was a 
calibration issue and couldn’t be immediately fixed.69
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Date Machine 
Type 
State Location/Description 
November 
2004 
Sequoia: 
AVC Edge 
Washington Snohomish County, WA: 
Voters in at least four polling precincts reported that they 
experienced vote-switching errors.  They explained that the 
review screen showed they had chosen the opposing 
candidate.  It took several attempts for each voter to correct 
the mistakes.  Review screens showed that the correct 
candidates had been selected.  Snohomish County elections 
official Bob Terwilliger reported that the problem only 
occurred in 15 out of 950 electronic voting machines 
throughout the county.70
November 
2006 
ES&S: 
M150 
Wisconsin Taylor County, WI: 
Four and a half months after the election, a consulting firm 
discovered that the optical scanners were programmed 
incorrectly.  All straight-party votes were lost, affecting 
approximately 600 ballots.71
November 
2004 
ES&S: 
Optech III-P 
Eagle 
Wyoming Natrona County, WY: 
In several municipal races, the Unity Election Management 
System, used to tally votes from both optical scan machines 
and paperless electronic voting machines, failed to tally 
votes correctly.  Noticing that the ballot totals in the city of 
Evansville seemed low, election officials checked the 
printouts from the precinct voting machines.  They found 
that the totals didn't match the totals computed by the Unity 
software.  Election officials conducted a recount using 
printouts from the voting machines and the paper absentee 
ballots.72
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APPENDIX B:  SELECTION OF ADDITIONAL PRECINCTS 
IN CLOSE ELECTIONS 
 
Although we strove to make the discussion in the main text of this report non-technical, 
some readers might like additional details about the probability models that underlie our 
discussion of full-precinct audits. 
 
The basic goal in auditing an election is to find any errors or fraud.  As a lower bound, an 
audit must be capable of finding any discrepancies that lead to a change in the outcome of 
an election.  Our model first determines how many precincts must have discrepancies to 
change the outcome of an election, and then determines how many precincts must be 
sampled to discover that discrepancy. 
 
A. ESTIMATING THE NUMBER OF DISCREPANT PRECINCTS 
 
The granularity of the audit is a single precinct.  To determine the necessary sample, we must 
first determine the minimum number of precincts that must have error or fraud in order to 
modify the outcome of the election. 
 
To estimate the number of discrepant precincts: 
 
1. Assume that a switch of more than twenty percent of the votes in any given precinct 
would be detected without an audit (as previously discussed, supra at page 12, this is a 
common assumption made in academic papers that address post-election audits). 
 
2. Then calculate b by assuming that there are just enough discrepant precincts (with no 
more than twenty percent of any given precinct’s votes corrupted, as discussed in 
step 1) to reverse the unofficial margin of victory.  In a simple two-candidate race, a 
switch of twenty percent of the votes in all precincts in a jurisdiction would swing 
the margin of victory forty percent.  This is the maximum overall vote shift; each 
precinct would show discrepancies.  For example, an election whose actual count is 
sixty-five percent in favor of Candidate A and thirty-five percent in favor of 
Candidate B would end up as forty-five percent for A, fifty-five percent for B.  
Stanislevic provides a formula for calculating b for an arbitrary vote-switching 
maximum as well as an algorithm for calculating b when precincts are of different 
sizes.1 
 
In essence, this method specifies the assumed distribution of discrepant precincts that an 
audit should search for.  A race with a relatively narrow margin of victory must be assumed 
to have few corrupt precincts.  Conversely, this method holds that, for a wide-margin race, 
an audit should be designed to detect a relatively large number of discrepant precincts, 
because reversing a wide-margin race would require corruption in many precincts. 
 
                                                 
1 Howard Stanislevic, Random Auditing of E-Voting Systems: How Much Is Enough? 9 (version as of Aug. 16, 2006) 
(Aug. 9, 2006), available at http://www.votetrustusa.org/pdfs/VTTF/EVEPAuditing.pdf. 
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B. GETTING TO THE “CONFIDENCE LEVEL” 
 
Once we know the minimum number of discrepant precincts for a given margin, the basic 
question of the post-election audit becomes, “If there are b discrepant precincts out of a 
total of N precincts, how many precincts must be sampled to have x percent chance of 
finding at least one of the discrepant precincts?”  Note there is a mathematical simplification 
to discussing detection in terms of finding at least one discrepant precinct, rather than 
detecting an exact number of discrepant precincts.  Since detecting at least one precinct 
aligns with the practical goals of a post-election audit, this is how we will frame the rest of 
our discussion. 
 
A probability model, widely known as “sampling without replacement,” answers this 
question exactly.  Instead of going through the mathematics involved, and reviewing those 
exact answers, we describe some general features of this model as applied to the post-
election auditing context. 
 
1. Confidence level: The chance of finding at least one discrepant precinct (the x 
percent in the question posed above) is commonly referred to as the confidence level.  
For example, an audit that is designed to provide a ninety-five percent chance of 
finding at least one discrepant precinct is said to have a ninety-five percent 
confidence level.  We are making an assumption about the probability of detection 
with the audit method.  This is not “confidence level” as used in hypothesis testing 
for statistical significance. 
 
2. Input:  The formula for sampling without replacement takes the total number of 
precincts, the number of discrepant or miscounted precincts, and the number of 
precincts audited (i.e., audit size) as inputs. 
 
3. Output:  Once the three input variables are specified, the sampling without 
replacement model reveals the probability of finding a specific number of discrepant 
precincts. 
 
4. A few simple rules: 
a. For a given total number of precincts and a fixed audit size, a greater number 
of discrepant precincts creates a greater probability that at least one of them 
will be detected through the audit. 
 
b. For two jurisdictions with different numbers of precincts, an audit size of the 
same percentage of precincts will have an equal chance of detecting the same 
number of discrepant precincts.  Thus, for example, if Jurisdiction A has 100 
precincts and Jurisdiction B has 1,000 precincts, a five percent audit of both 
jurisdictions would have an equal chance of detecting twenty discrepant 
precincts. 
 
Note in this example that Jurisdiction A has a discrepancy rate of twenty 
percent, while the discrepancy rate in Jurisdiction B is two percent; yet a five 
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percent audit of both jurisdictions produces the same probability of detecting 
at least one discrepant precinct. 
 
c. For a given discrepancy rate (e.g., twenty percent of precincts have 
discrepancies), a jurisdiction with a small number of precincts must audit a 
higher percentage of its precincts if it is to have the same chance as a larger 
jurisdiction of detecting at least one discrepant precinct.  In terms of the 
example above, for a discrepancy rate of twenty percent and a ninety-five 
percent probability of finding at least one discrepant precinct, Jurisdiction A 
must audit a higher percentage of its precincts than Jurisdiction B. 
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APPENDIX C:  RANDOMNESS SELECTION PROCEDURES 
 
THE ROLE OF DICE IN ELECTION AUDITS – EXTENDED ABSTRACT 
Arel Cordero* (arel@cs.berkeley.edu), David Wagner* (daw@cs.berkeley.edu), David Dill† 
(dill@cs.stanford.edu) (June 16, 2006) 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Random audits are a powerful technique for statistically verifying that an election was 
tabulated correctly.  Audits are especially useful for checking the correctness of electronic 
voting machines when used in conjunction with a voter-verified paper audit trail (VVPAT).  
While laws in many states already require election audits, they generally do not address the 
procedure for generating the random sample [12].  The sample generation procedure, 
however, is critical to the security of the audit, and current practices expose a security flaw.  
This paper examines the problem of sample selection in the context of election audits, 
identifies necessary requirements for such a procedure, and proposes practical solutions that 
satisfy those requirements. 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Many things can go wrong in an election, whether intentionally or unintentionally.  The 
ability to detect (and correct) errors is critical.  Recent decades have seen widespread use of 
computers and automation in elections, including use of optical scan machines, DRE (direct 
recording electronic) machines, and computerized election management systems to record, 
tabulate, and report votes.  Unfortunately, this trend has come at some cost to transparency, 
as the automation of these processes reduces opportunities for observers and interested 
members of the public to monitor the operation of the election.  Random audits, performed 
after the election but before certification, remain as one of the few defenses for ensuring 
fairness and for building public confidence in the result.  Consequently, the details of these 
audits are of increasing importance to election integrity. 
 
When done right, and in a transparent and publicly observable way, random audits can 
establish objective and quantifiable measures of election accuracy.1  However, without a 
transparent process, there is no reason to believe an audit will correctly represent the 
election, which would defeat objectivity, rendering it meaningless as an assurance of fairness.  
Even if correct, a non-transparent audit would have trouble quelling skepticism and could 
thereby fail to provide confidence in an election. 
 
All parts of an audit must be performed correctly—and transparently—for the audit to mean 
anything.  In particular, getting the random sample selection process right is critical.  To start 
with, the selection process must ensure every vote has an equal (or minimal) probability of 
being selected.  Moreover, like any fair lottery, a second requirement is that no party be able 
                                                 
* University of California, Berkeley, CA, 94720 
† Stanford University, Stanford, CA, 94305 
1 The theory of statistical polling and statistical quality control provides a quantitative measure of confidence in 
the accuracy of election results, which can be calculated as a function of parameters such as the sample size [9]. 
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to bias or predict the selection in any way.  An important implication is: for an audit to give every 
party confidence in an election, every party must also have confidence in the fairness of the sample selection.  In 
other words, sample selection can easily become a weak link in the security of an election. 
 
A case in point is the 2004 U.S. presidential contest in Cleveland, Ohio [8].  Cleveland 
election workers, in an effort to prevent a complete recount, surreptitiously preselected an 
audit sample (3% of the total precincts) to ensure the ballots recounted by hand would 
match the initial machine counts.  Then, with public observers present, the workers faked a 
random selection and the preselected sample was used, defeating the purpose of the audit.  
Because of this deliberate or negligent action, the true result of the race in Ohio, the deciding 
state in the presidential race, may never be known.  To that extent, the integrity—or 
security—of the election was compromised. 
 
2 BACKGROUND 
 
In the United States, elections are conducted at a local level [3].  In California, for instance, 
specifications for equipment are set by Secretary of State and are implemented by counties 
according to California election code [1].  As residents of Alameda County, California, we 
have observed the election and audit procedures used there, and we will use California and 
Alameda County as a running example of current practices. 
 
2.1  CALIFORNIA 
 
California election code has included, for the past four decades, a requirement for a 1% 
manual tally (or audit) after every election: 
 
§336.5 “One percent manual tally” is the public process of manually tallying 
votes in 1 percent of the precincts, selected at random by the elections 
official, and in one precinct for each race not included in the randomly 
selected precincts.  This procedure is conducted during the official canvass to 
verify the accuracy of the automated count [2]. 
 
The process is public, meaning that any citizen is invited to observe every step of the audit.  
This requires a transparent process.  They 1% manual audit is performed as part of the 
official canvass, as one of the last steps before the final election results are certified.  
Typically, after the sample is selected, election officials print out a report containing the 
electronic tallies for just the selected precincts, recount by hand (using three- or four-person 
recount boards) all the paper ballots cast in each selected polling place, and check to make 
sure that the manual count in each precinct matches the electronic count in that precinct. 
 
The law requires every county to randomly select a minimum of 1% of precincts for the 
manual recount, but does not stipulate how it should be done.  As it happens, Alameda 
County (Figure 1), and presumably many other counties, have turned to computers to 
perform the random selection. 
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Largest Cities Oakland, Fremont, Hayward, Berkeley 
Population 1,507,500 
Registered Voters 714,490 
Total Voting Precincts 1,140 
Absentee Precincts 240 
Figure 1: Some basic facts about Alameda County, CA. 
 
3 SAMPLE SELECTION 
 
Computers are generally inappropriate for generating random samples in an election audit.  Excellent 
software-based pseudorandom number generators (PRNGs) exist, so it might not be 
obvious why this use of computers in election audits is inappropriate.  The inherent problem is 
transparency: running software is not observable.  In fact, this is the exact problem faced by 
DREs, and the exact problem election audits, together with voter-verified paper audit trail 
(VVPAT) systems, intend to address.  The use of a computer as a random source jeopardizes 
the integrity of the audit and election. 
 
One devastating threat is that an insider might be able to tamper with the software used for 
random selection in a way that allows him or her to know in advance the outcome of the 
selection.  An insider could then use this to cheat without—or with a lesser probability of—
getting caught.  For instance, an insider with advance knowledge of the selected precincts 
will be free to defraud all other precincts without fear of detection.  Or, if the insider has 
already tampered with the votes in some precincts, the insider could modify the computer’s 
PRNG to exclude the possibility of choosing those precincts.  These attacks could be 
mounted in a way that is very difficult or impossible for observers to detect.  Without a 
verifiably random sample, it is not clear that such an accusation could be defended against. 
 
Dedicated hardware random number generators (perhaps based on physical phenomena 
such as radioactive decay, or radio static) are subject to the same transparency problem, 
despite typically being excellent random number generators.  Without transparency, even 
with a perfect random source, it is hard or impossible to trust the authenticity of its output 
(Figure 2). 
 
 
Figure 2: Transparency can be a problem regardless of the quality 
of the random number generator. 
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3.1 REQUIREMENTS 
 
As we saw above, “black-box” random sources are a vulnerability for election audits.  What 
requirements must a viable source meet?  Many choices exist for generating random 
numbers; providing them unpredictable—in this case, to all parties—is difficult, if even 
possible [11].  What matters in the election setting, however, is choosing a procedure that 
can be used, understood, and trusted by an average member of the voting public, for 
instance, by an average high school graduate. 
 
A transparent procedure for sample selection involves two problems: 
 
1. Transparently generating random bits, and 
 
2. Transparently turning those bits into a sample. 
 
Technically, this may seem like a trivial distinction.  However, the requirements that follow 
apply equally to both, and especially because the needs of a general audience must be 
considered, satisfying the requirements for both is not as easy as it might seem.  Many 
natural schemes have non-obvious problems or pitfalls.  In the remainder of the section we 
lay out several requirements for a transparent random source and selection procedure, and 
subsequently evaluate possible solutions against these requirements. 
 
Simplicity.  The procedure must be simple to follow and execute.  The public must, without 
extensive education, understand the procedure, why it is fair, and why they should trust it.  
Otherwise, confidence in the audit and election may be limited.  Additionally, complexity 
introduces opportunities for error or exploitation. 
 
Verifiability.  The procedure must be verifiable either by inspection (i.e., it is physically observable) or by 
some other property (e.g., cryptography).  Verifiability is imperative.  Every observing party must be 
assured that the selection is genuinely random with a satisfactory distribution.  Otherwise, as 
in Ohio, the audit could be subverted, or observer’s confidence undermined. 
 
Robustness.  The distribution of the procedure must be hard to bias or manipulate.  It should be 
difficult for any party, particularly someone working from the inside, to affect or gain 
information about what set of ballots is included or excluded from the audit. 
 
Efficiency.  The procedure must not take an incommensurate amount of resources to prepare or execute.  
Election worker’s and observer’s time, energy, money, patience cannot be taken for granted.  
As the incident in Ohio demonstrated, the cost of time might tempt election workers to 
fudge the procedure.  Or, perhaps, impatience could reduce an observer’s vigilance. 
 
4 POSSIBLE RANDOM SOURCES 
 
We first examine the applicability of several random sources to election audits, in light of the 
requirements above. 
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Cryptography.  From the perspective of a cryptographer, the problem of verifiably-random 
numbers is (at least in principle) solved.  One solution [7], for instance, is to have every 
observer pick a random number of their own and commit to it, perhaps by writing it down 
and dropping it in a box.  When everyone has committed their numbers, they are revealed 
and summed modulo some number N.  The result will be a random number if at least one 
observer was honest.  This could then be built into a very reasonable scheme to perform 
sample selection. 
 
To an extent, this solution meets all our criteria.  However, if we consider trying to explain 
this to the general public and to election’s officials, it might take some work.  The concepts 
of modular arithmetic, independence, and uniformity of distributions must be understood.  
Also, cryptographic protocols often rely on participants to protect their own interests, which 
can be a problem when dealing with a non-cryptographer public.  For instance, suppose 
instead of dropping numbers into a box, numbers are written on a board so that the attacker 
has the “last say,” and thus deterministically chooses the outcome.  The protocol assumes a 
savvy enough public to know that commitments are supposed to be hidden. 
 
Drawings.  A familiar method of random selection is a drawing in which tickets are mixed 
then drawn from a hat or box.  For instance, we could write all the precincts down on pieces 
of paper, place them in a box, mix the pieces of paper well, and draw our sample. 
 
Verifiability is difficult when many objects are involved.  For instance, if there are 1,000 
tickets for 1,000 precincts, every observer must be assured that all precincts are included in 
the drawing because omissions represent those precincts an attacker could subvert freely.  
Thus, robustness is an issue as well. 
 
The use of many objects also makes it hard to tell whether they have been adequately mixed.  
For instance, the Vietnam draft lottery of 1970 used such a scheme, but was later discovered 
to have suffered from bias: birth-dates later in the year were added last, and due to 
insufficient mixing, were more likely to be chosen earlier [13]. 
 
Lottery-Style Drawings.  Lotteries put a great deal of resources and creativity into 
maintaining secure random number generators.  Lottery machines are culturally familiar and 
trusted to the extent that the lottery is played by millions of people.  It would be 
prohibitively expensive, however, to replicate and maintain a lottery machine in each 
Registrar of Voters office, so if we were to create a sampling scheme from lottery numbers, 
we would want to use the same machinery—and perhaps drawings—used for the actual 
lottery. 
 
Although simplicity, verifiability, and robustness are excellent, efficiency can become a 
problem and must be carefully considered in any scheme using lottery drawings.  For 
instance, if a state lottery is chosen, this might impose a heavy travel burden on vigilant 
observers determined to witness the selection.  Another issue might arise because U.S. 
elections are performed locally: if a single dedicated state-wide lottery were used for 
selection, coordination between county and state might be a problem (e.g., the lottery could 
only be done when the last county is ready). 
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Alternatively, the use of an agreed-upon future drawing as input to a deterministic algorithm 
that creates the sample, might make an excellent scheme.  However, the algorithm must also 
satisfy the requirements in Section 3.1.  Particularly, it must be verifiable and understandable 
to the general public. 
 
Random Number Charts.  Another idea might be to use a book filled with random 
numbers [10] as a basis for selection.  Of course, printed books or charts are static 
documents and must be assumed to be known in advance to any attacker.  Consequently, 
any methods that use books of random numbers would have to find another random 
method of selecting digits within the documents. 
 
Cards.  Cards are a time-tested source of randomness.  Indeed, they are used in many high-
stakes games.  However, there are fifty-two cards in a deck, making it hard to verify—
especially when subject to sleights of hand, such as those found in card tricks.  As with 
drawings, it might be difficult to ensure the deck is sufficiently shuffled. 
 
Another issue with cards is that not everyone is familiar with their properties (the suits, the 
ranks, the number of cards), nor how to handle or shuffle cards well.  We would prefer a 
sample selection scheme that as many people as possible understand and could use. 
 
Depending on how the cards are used, efficiency could also come into play, since every 
action needs to be observed and verified, and preceded by a shuffle. 
 
Coins and Dice.  Coins are the quintessential random number generator and arguably the 
most ubiquitous.  Methods even exist to mitigate any bias in a coin2.  The primary drawback 
of coins is that their bandwidth is limited: generating many bits of randomness requires 
many coin tosses, which takes time. 
 
Dice produce a higher bandwidth of random numbers3, and are available with different 
numbers of faces.  Ten-sided dice are especially appealing because they map directly onto the 
decimal numbers.  Efficiency can be quite reasonable with dice, especially when multiple dice 
are rolled at once. 
 
Dice, as with coins, can be biased—intentionally perhaps—so care must be taken to ensure 
fair dice [5].  Techniques for mitigating potential attacks exist and include: using only new, 
translucent dice; using a ribbed tumbler to roll the dice; and rolling the dice onto a flat ridged 
surface such as a dice tray (Figure 3).  A dice setup involves the use of few objects, which is 
good for verification, and dice are simple to understand.  They have stood the test of time4 
and are commonly used in games, including high-stakes games.  In our proposed solutions 
that follow we choose dice as the source of randomness primarily because of the simplicity, 
and the verifiability benefits of using few objects. 
 
                                                 
2 Assuming independence of coin flips, pairs of flips from the same coin can be used to eliminate any bias the 
coin may have.  If we throw out any HEADS-HEADS or TAILS-TAILS combinations, we are left with two 
outcomes that bare equal probabilities.  This idea is attributed to John von Neumann. 
3 Dice can be considered multi-faced coins. 
4 In fact, dice have existed for thousands of years. 
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Figure 3: A ten-sided die, tumbler and tray. 
 
Number Precinct ID 
0 P1 
1 P2 
…
 …
 
N – 1 PN 
Figure 4: A numbered list of precincts. 
 
5 CREATING THE SAMPLE 
 
Once a source of randomness is chosen, a practical procedure must be built around it to 
perform the sample selection.  The procedure, like the random source, must satisfy our 
above requirements: it must be simple to use and understand, easy to verify, robust against 
tampering and reasonably efficient. 
 
For schemes we present, we opted for simplicity because that makes the other requirements 
easier to reason about.  While designing a procedure for Alameda County, our initial 
proposals involved the use of math (not necessarily complex math).  However, the feedback 
we got indicated the less math, the better.  We then considered using computers to perform 
the math during the selection, but our feedback indicated that no reliance on computers was 
preferable.  We also considered creating worksheets, such as tax worksheets, to guide users 
through the procedure.  However, people generally do not enjoy working on taxes, and if 
people were to find the worksheets inefficient or frustrating, they might elect to fudge or 
abandon the procedure. 
 
Keeping that in mind, we tried to separate the “work” from the “sheet” by creating pro-
computed lookup tables.  The procedure we arrived at requires virtually no math to use. 
 
The Basic Idea.  We begin by preparing a list (numbered 0, 1, 2, …, N – 1) of the 
population we are sampling from.  In California, this would involve preparing a list of the 
names (or IDs) of every precinct to be included in the audit.  Numbering each entry 
sequentially from 0 to N – 1 establishes a one-to-one mapping of the integers [0, N – 1] to 
the list of precincts (Figure 4).  Election officials commit to this ordering before the audit by 
publishing the list and providing a copy to each political party and each observer.  We 
assume that the audit is not performed until a final electronic tally is available; the goal is to 
verify whether these alleged election results match the paper records.  Election officials 
commit to the electronic results before the audit by printing the electronic vote totals broken 
down by precinct, or by writing them onto write-once media (such as CD-ROM), and 
providing a copy to every interested observer. 
 
Once these preparation steps have been completed, the random selection process begins.  In 
our scheme, an election official rolls an appropriate number of dice to get a random number 
between 0 and N – 1, and then uses the one-to-one mapping established earlier to interpret 
this number as identifying a single precinct.  This precinct is added to the random sample, 
and the process is repeated until the random sample is of the desired size. 
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If we used standard six-sided dice, rolling k dice would allow us to randomly choose a 
number between 0 and 6k – 1 by reading off the k outcomes and treating them as a number 
in base-6.  However, requiring election officials and observers to perform base-6 arithmetic 
may be unreasonable.  Therefore, instead of using standard dice, we propose using 
commonly available ten-sided dice5, letting each die signify a decimal digit.  For example, if 
we want to select one precinct from a list of 1000, we could use three dice to get a number 
between 0 and 999. 
 
The above procedure handles the case where N is a power of ten.  If N is not a power of 
ten, one simple method is to roll [log10 N] ten-sided dice, and then re-roll if the resulting 
number is too large.  For instance, suppose we want to choose at random from a list of N = 
750 precincts.  Throwing three dice gives us a random number from 0 to 999.  Because only 
the numbers 0 through 749 correspond to precincts on our list, we ignore and re-roll any 
time we get a number greater than 749.  Because every three-digit number has an equal 
probability of appearing6, this method produces a uniform distribution over 750 precincts. 
 
As we have presented it so far, this scheme works reasonably well for a small number of 
selections, (say N ≤ 1000).  However, re-rolling can become a problem.  There is a 
significant difference between using three dice to select 1% of 1,000 precincts, and using 
four dice to select 1% of 1,001.  Below, we address this issue by using more general range-
lookup tables. 
 
5.1 GENERAL DICE SCHEME 
 
As discussed above, re-rolling can become inefficient quite quickly.  To address this, a 
natural optimization is to divide the range of the dice into N equal intervals, letting each 
interval correspond to a precinct on the list7. 
 
For example, suppose we want to use four ten-sided dice to select a precinct from a list of N 
= 1001 precincts.  First we divide the range [0, 9999] into 1,001 equal sized intervals [0, 8], 
[9, 17], …, [8991, 8999], [9000, 9008].  We then let each interval correspond to a precinct on 
our list, allowing the remainder, [9009, 9999], to correspond to a re-roll.  As a result, we 
throw out roughly 1 out of 10 rolls instead of 9 out of 10, improving efficiency greatly.  See 
Algorithm 1 for a specification of this scheme. 
 
We can simplify the presentation of this scheme by changing how we prepare the numbered 
list of precincts.  Instead of labeling each precinct with an integer, we could label each 
precinct with its pre-computed range (Figure 5).  Now, no arithmetic is necessary to do the 
selection: one can simply roll k dice and then look up the outcome on the list to obtain a 
precinct. 
 
                                                 
5 10-sided dice can be found at game stores, are often used in board and role-playing games, and typically are 
numbered 0 through 9. 
6 Subject to any bias present in the random source.  If a verifiable and robust source is used, according to our 
requirements in Section 3.1, this bias is negligible. 
7 We use division, rather than modulo, because division is a more familiar concept to a general audience. 
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Algorithm 1 General Dice Scheme 
INPUTS: 
N — number of precincts 
n — size of sample 
OUTPUTS: 
S — set of precincts selected for the sample
ALGORITHM: 
S ← Ø 
k ← [log10N] 
    (k = the number of tosses per selection) 
d ← [10k/N] 
while |S| < n, do: 
Roll k dice to get a random number 
x ∈ {0, 1, …, 10k – 1}. 
Set y ← [x/d]. 
If y < N and y ∉ S, then: 
Set S ← S ∪{y}. 
return S 
 
Numbers Precinct ID 
0…8 P1 
9…17 P2 
…
 …
 
9000…9008 P1001 
9009…9999 RE-ROLL 
 
Figure 5: A list of 1001 precincts labeled with 
equal-sized ranges. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.2 ANALYSIS 
 
It should first be noted that this simple idea of using range-lookup tables applies to other 
random sources, and can enable other nice things like allowing for a controlled bias (say to 
account for precinct sizes). 
 
Advantages.  The foremost advantage of this scheme over computer-based PRNGs is the 
use of an observable random source.  Dice are simple, robust and familiar enough to be 
widely accepted.8.  Dividing up the range of the dice improves efficiency while maintaining 
simplicity.  The efficiency and usability of this scheme is excellent.  As shown in Figure 6, 
election officials can easily select a random sample of 1% of the precincts, and even very 
large counties will not need too many tosses of the dice.  For instance, even with N = 2000, 
only about 25 tosses of the dice (on average) are needed to select a random 1% sample.  This 
fairness of the scheme is also verifiable (to the extent that dice are) because the lookup table 
is published; it can be inspected after the fact to verify that, for example, every precinct was 
included and had an equal chance of being selected. 
 
Disadvantages.  When the size of the sample is a large ratio of the population, many more 
re-rolls would be expected, as “collisions” occur in the sample selection.  For small ratios 
this loss is negligible. 
 
Unfortunately, the cost of this scheme scales linearly (keeping the sample to population ratio 
constant) with the size of the sample.  While this might be suitable for selecting 1% of 500 
or 1,000 precincts, it might be too time consuming to select 1% of 1,000,000. 
 
                                                 
8 The proposal to use dice was met with enthusiasm from election officials in Alameda County. 
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A second concern is the threat of biased dice.  If a malicious party were able to affect the 
distributions of the dice (say by weighting a die or by swapping in a die with duplicate faces), 
that party could affect which precincts get selected, or worse, which precincts do not get 
selected. 
 
Efficiency.  In an election setting, dice not only have to be rolled, but inspected by 
observers.  This incurs a cost per roll, so we measure the efficiency of our methods by the 
number of rolls they require. 
 
We can partially reduce this cost by rolling multiple dice at once.  If we do this, we must 
ensure the order of dice is well-specified in advance.  One idea is to use dice with different 
magnitudes on their faces, such as 1’s, 10’s, and 100’s.  Another possibility is to use dice of 
different colors and establish a clear ordering of the colors before rolling the dice.  A good 
choice in the United States would be red, white and blue for their culturally meaningful 
order.  This would enable us to roll three dice (one red, one white, and one blue) at a time; 
for instance, if the red one comes up 5, the white one 7, and the blue one 2, that would be 
interpreted as the three-digit number 572. 
 
 
Figure 6: The expected number of tosses of 10-sided dice to select a 1% sample 
using range-lookup tables (General dice scheme) versus simply re-rolling (Simple 
dice scheme) as a function of population size (N).  The Dice-hash scheme is a 
deterministic function, similar to [4], to calculate a sample selection using a 
constant number of dice rolls as input. 
 
6 RELATED WORK 
 
The idea of using auditing to gain statistical confidence in an election is not new.  Many 
states, such as California, already require random audits or manual tallies in their election 
codes. 
 
Prior work has looked at the issue of the statistical validity of random audits and what size 
sample is necessary to achieve a given degree of confidence [9].  In these papers, however, 
the sample selection process is not considered and is assumed to be perfect.  Some authors 
have examined the possibility of auditing individual ballots, stating that if adopted (in a 
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privacy-preserving way), audits of individual ballots could give much higher degrees of 
confidence with less overall counting [6, 9]. 
 
Other people have looked at verifiable methods of sample selection.  The IETF uses an 
algorithm based on cryptographically strong hash-function, to expand input from a random 
source into a sample [4].  In the full version of this paper we present a similar scheme, and 
address its viability in an election setting.  Some initial reactions, however, indicated 
resistance and skepticism from people unfamiliar with hash functions and cryptography, 
leading us to prefer a dice-only approach. 
 
7 CONTRIBUTIONS 
 
Sample selection is a critical part of an audit, but has been overlooked in the election setting, 
as evidenced by the wordings of election code [12], and existing current practices such as the 
use of software-based PRNGs.  We identify non-transparency as a vulnerability for every 
part of an audit, particularly sample selection, and lay out requirements that a transparent 
sample selection procedure must meet. 
 
In addition, we present an algorithm and implementation for transparent sample selection, 
using dice and a printed lookup table.  This scheme is simple and relatively efficient, no 
calculations are needed to perform the selection, and, if adopted, would make elections more 
trustworthy. 
 
8 CONCLUSION 
 
Transparency plays an important role in the security of election audits.  Because auditing is a 
public process capable of establishing confidence in an election’s outcome, it is critical that 
every part of the process, particularly the random sample selection, be transparent, 
observable, and understandable to all interested parties.  While the current use of computers 
to generate samples is neither transparent nor observable, we have presented a possible 
remedy that is simple, verifiable, low-cost, and robust. 
 
Ultimately, it is essential that we choose random audit procedures that are capable of 
convincing the whole population of the genuineness of the audit, and, in turn, of the 
election. 
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THE MACHINERY OF DEMOCRACY: 
PROTECTING ELECTIONS IN AN ELECTRONIC WORLD 
Lawrence Norden et al. (Brennan Center for Justice ed., 2006) 
 
APPENDIX F: EXAMPLE OF TRANSPARENT RANDOM SELECTION PROCESSES 
 
A transparent random selection is one where members of the public can verify that, at the 
time of the choice, all selections were equally probable.  Here are two examples of 
(reasonably) transparent random choice methods. There are many variations on these 
methods. 
 
Method A:  Each member of a group of individuals representing diverse interests chooses a 
random number (by any method) in a specified range 1…N and writes it down on a slip of 
paper.  After each participant has chosen a number, the numbers are revealed to all and 
added.  They are then divided by N, and the “integer remainder” is the number that is 
chosen (this is known in mathematics as the “modulo”). 
 
The best way to understand this is by example.  Little Pennasota County has 9 machines 
(labeled “1” through “9”) and wants to select one of these machines to Parallel Test.  They 
want to ensure that the machine is chosen at random.  To do this, they bring together several 
participants: a member of the League of Women Voters, the Democratic-Republicans, the 
Federalists, the Green Party, and the Libertarian Party.  Each person is asked to select a 
number.  The League of Women Voters’ representative selects the number 5, the 
Democratic-Republican chooses 6, the Federalist chooses 9, the Green chooses 8 and the 
Libertarian chooses 9.  These numbers are then revealed and added: 5+6+9+8+9=37.  They 
are then divided by 9.  The “integer remainder” is 1, because 37 is divisible by 9 four times, 
with an integer remainder of 1 (or, 36 + 1).  In this scenario, machine number 1 is chosen. 
 
Any member of the group can assure the result is not “fixed” by the others.  In the example 
above, all of the political parties might want to conspire to ensure that machine number 2 is 
picked for Parallel Testing.  However, the League of Women Voters representative will 
prevent them from being able to do this: without knowing what number she is going to pick, 
they cannot know what the integer remainder will be.  
 
Method B: Color-coded, transparent 10-sided dice are rolled (in a dice cup) in public view.  
The digits on the top faces of the dice are read off in a fixed order determined by the colors 
(e.g., first red, then white, then blue).  This yields a random 3-digit number.  If the number is 
out of the desired range, it is discarded and the method performed again.  
 
Note about transparently random selection process:  For a transparently random 
selection process to work, (1) how the randomly selected number is going to be used must 
be clearly stated in advance (i.e., if we are choosing a number to decide which machine to 
Parallel Test, each machine must be labeled with one of the numbers that may be chosen), 
(2) the process for randomly selecting numbers must be understood by all participants, and 
(3) the event of randomly selecting numbers must be observable to all participants (and, if 
possible, members of the public). 
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For example, if we are picking what team of police are going to be left to look after the 
locked-up and security-sealed election materials before completion of the Automatic Routine 
Audit, the observers and participants must see the committed list of police that are being 
selected from in advance of the selection.  The list must be posted visibly or in some other 
way “committed to” so that the association between random numbers selected and people 
selected cannot be switched after the numbers are produced. 
 
In terms of assigning auditors to roles and machines to be audited, the goal might be to 
make sure that there is one Democratic-Republican and one Federalist assigned to review 
the paper records (the readers) and one Democratic-Republican and one Federalist assigned 
to tally the records (the writers).  There should be no way to know what machines anyone 
will be assigned to, nor who will be teamed with whom during the audit. 
 
If the use or interpretation of the random numbers is not clear and committed in advance, 
then an appropriately situated attacker might “interpret” the random number in a way that 
allows the attack go undetected by, for example, assigning attackers as auditors for all the 
subverted machines.1 
                                                 
1 The importance of making sure that observer/participant understand how the random numbers are to be 
used is amusingly illustrated in the magic special: Penn & Teller: Off the Deep End (NBC television broadcast, 
Nov 13th, 2005). In this program an unsuspecting individual is fooled into thinking that the magicians could 
figure out in advance what card he or she will select because, no matter what card is selected, the magicians can 
point to its representation somewhere on the beach. The humorous approach here is that all 52 playing cards 
were set up in interesting ways on the beach to be revealed. A magician opened his coat for one card, two kids 
in the water held up their rafts to form a card, a sunbather turned around with a card painted on her back, 
cards were found inside of a potted plant and coconut, etc. 
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